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Abstract 
The prevalence of medical misdiagnosis has remained high despite the adoption of 
diagnostic software. This ongoing controversy about the role of technology in mitigating 
the problem of misdiagnosis centers on the question of whether diagnostic software does 
reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis if properly relied upon by physicians. The purpose 
of this quantitative, cross-sectional study based on planned behavior theory was to 
measure doctors’ opinions of diagnostic technology’s medical utility. Recruitment e-
mails were sent to 3,100 AMA-accredited physicians through their database that yielded 
a sample of 99 physicians for the study.  One-sample t tests and, where appropriate 
because of non-normal data, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted on 
the data to address the following key research questions on whether diagnostic software 
decreases misdiagnosis in healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic method, if 
physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare, and if liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.  It 
was found that in the opinion of those surveyed (a) diagnostic software was likely to 
result in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods, (b) 
when speaking for themselves, physicians thought they used diagnostic software 
frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses, and (c) physicians agreed they were not 
prevented from using diagnostic software because of liability concerns. The study’s 
social significance is the affirmation of diagnostic software’s usefulness: Policy and 
technology stakeholders can use this finding to speed the adoption of diagnostic software, 
leading to a reduction in the socially costly problem of misdiagnosis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Background 
Medical misdiagnosis is an immensely costly problem. Globally, misdiagnosis is 
responsible for millions of patient deaths every year; in the United States, about 100,000 
people die every year because of misdiagnosis (Leavitt & Leavitt, 2011). Misdiagnosis 
leads to economic costs as well, by raising the already high cost of healthcare delivery. 
The costs of an inaccurate or slow diagnosis are high and include costs of delayed 
treatment, litigation, malpractice insurance payouts, and the lost economic productivity of 
the patient (Schweitzer, 2007). The dynamics of medical decision-making are changing 
in response to increased pressures on the global healthcare system. In developed 
countries, the amount of money spent on healthcare is typically the largest single 
component of gross domestic product (GDP; Krugman & Wells, 2009). Given the human 
and economic problems created by misdiagnosis, there is added pressure to bring new 
efficiencies to the delivery of healthcare (Cleverly, Cleverly, & Song, 2010). These 
pressures affect the practice of diagnosis, specifically in creating an imperative for 
diagnoses to be made more quickly and accurately (Goldsmith, 2011).  
The combination of these pressures and the availability of increasingly 
sophisticated medical technology have resulted in the popularity of diagnostic medical 
software in most developed countries (Scott & Rundall, 2007). Diagnostic software has 
been widely available since the 1990s, but advancements in the underlying artificial 
intelligence (AI) of such software and its integration with other aspects of healthcare 
information technology have resulted in an increase in the use of diagnostic software in 
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the United Kingdom (Graham, 2010; Hawe, 2010) and the United States in particular 
(Cleverly et al., 2010). This development has been praised as well as critiqued 
(Spekowius & Wendler, 2006). Supporters of diagnostic software emphasize its accuracy 
and speed; detractors of diagnostic software have suggested that the use of such software 
predisposes physicians to be lazy (Arora, 2010), and that diagnostic software can make 
inaccurate recommendations when dealing with complex or nuanced medical problems 
(Bligh, 2009). Thus, the immediate background for this study was the ongoing 
controversy (Ahlers, Jaeger, & Jakstat, 2010) about the role of technology in mitigating 
the problem of misdiagnosis. The first part of the controversy centered on the question of 
whether diagnostic software can indeed reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis but is not 
properly relied upon by physicians for this end. The other part questioned whether 
diagnostic software could not reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis because misdiagnosis 
emerges from factors that are beyond the ability of diagnostic software to address.  What 
was already known is that, despite an adoption rate that has been estimated between 55 
and 70% (Chernick, 2011; Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011), the implementation rate  of 
diagnostic software has not coincided with a reduction in the prevalence of misdiagnosis; 
what was not known is why the  use of diagnostic software has not concomitantly 
reduced diagnostic error rates.  
In this chapter, I describe the problem statement, identify a meaningful gap in the 
current research literature, and present evidence that the problem is relevant and 
demanded attention. I present theoretical framework that is associated with the 
foundation of the study and frame the research questions, hypotheses, research design, 
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and methodology in a manner that built upon the existing research. I discuss the purpose, 
nature, and the significance of the study. I describe the potential contributions of the 
study to the advancement of the discipline as well as the social change implication in 
accordance to the scope of the study.  
Problem Statement 
          The problem is the prevalence of high levels of misdiagnosis (Leavitt & Leavitt, 
2011) despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software and the improvements in 
such software over time. Throughout the literature, authors have suggested several 
possibilities for why this problem might exist. There have been suggestions that the 
inherent possibility of misdiagnosis is high because of the interaction of several complex 
factors that cannot be addressed by software (Sokolowski & Banks, 2011). There were 
also suggestions that diagnostic software is capable of reducing misdiagnosis but that 
physicians insufficiently or infrequently rely upon it. The academic dimension of this 
problem was the absence of more definitive knowledge why misdiagnosis has persisted 
well into the age of diagnostic software (Sokolowski & Banks, 2011).    
Purpose of the Study   
The purpose of this quantitative study was to draw upon physician-provided data 
to determine why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has 
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. For the first two 
research questions of the study, the independent variable was whether diagnostic software 
was used, and the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the third 
research question of the study, the independent variable was knowledge of diagnostic 
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software, and the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the fourth 
research question of the study, the independent variable was liability concern, and the 
dependent variable was use of diagnostic software.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The research questions that guided the study were as follows: 
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?  
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than   
unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
HA1: Diagnostic software use has less misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted 
human diagnostic methods. 
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
HA2: Physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive 
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
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HA3: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software?   
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.  
HA4: Liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. 
Nature of the Study 
Addressing the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software 
has not coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis could be achieved 
with both a quantitative and a qualitative approach. A quantitative approach could 
determine which of the possible answers to this question—diagnostic software 
insufficiency, insufficient/improper use by physicians, liability, or other reasons—is more 
popular with physicians, and to determine whether answers to this question vary 
significantly depending on the demographic and professional characteristics of 
physicians. A qualitative approach could provide a narrative explanation of results; for 
example, if the quantitative analysis reveals that physicians think that diagnostic software 
is diagnostically useful but under used, then qualitative analysis could be an appropriate 
means of determining why physicians do not use diagnostic software more frequently, 
despite its utility. A quantitative approach was used in this study in order to obtain 
necessary empirical insight into physicians’ attitudes towards diagnostic software, insight 
that can be used to inform future quantitative as well as qualitative research.  I used a 
quantitative, cross-sectional approach in this study to examine whether physicians think 
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there is a connection between diagnostic software used and misdiagnosis in a manner that 
addressed some of the gaps in the literature noted in Chapter 2. More detail about the 
method is provided in Chapter 3.       
Theoretical Base  
In order to explore the question of diagnostic software’s utility as a means of 
reducing misdiagnosis, some theory capable of explaining the interface between 
physicians and software is required. Accordingly, the first theoretical base for the study 
centered on the theory of distributed cognition (Ajzen, 2005), which suggested that the 
combination of humans and technology results in higher quality and more quickly 
rendered decisions, as long as humans use technology with sufficient frequency and skill. 
The theory of distributed cognition predicts that human decision-makers will employ 
software or other technology to assist them when the benefits of doing so (in terms of the 
quantity and quality of decisions) outweigh the costs (such as the emotional burdens of 
delegating some aspects of decision-making to machines or feeling a loss of control or 
expertise). These aspects of the theory of distributed cognition underlie the approach to 
answering the research questions of this study. The second theoretical foundation for the 
study is the theory of planned behavior, which was a specific model for explaining the 
human component of a human-software system of distributed cognition (Ajzen, 2005; 
Herath, 2010).   The theory of planned behavior suggests that attitudinal perceptions of 
usefulness or other kinds of benefit drive behavioral decisions such as software adoption; 
the theory thus provides support for including diagnostic software adoption rates and 
attitudes in the same model. 
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Definition of Terms 
Adoption of diagnostic software: As one of the independent variables of the study, 
adoption of diagnostic software is a dichotomous variable with two levels: adoption and 
non adoption. 
Cognitive bias: A cognitive bias “is a generic defect in human reasoning based on 
flawed methods of collecting, processing, or analyzing information” (Schwab, 2008, p. 
23).  
 Computing: According to Woods and Woods (2000), “computing involves using 
numbers to count, solve problems, and gather information” (p. 7). Computing is a method 
of diagnosis or decision-making that is highly dependent on numerical analysis, and in 
which decisions are reached only if quantifiably justified.  
Diagnosis. Diagnosis refers to “the process of evaluating a patient’s medical 
condition with the aim of choosing an appropriate treatment” (McPhee, Papadakis, & 
Rabow, 2011. p. 56).  
Diagnostic outcomes: As one of the dependent variables of the study, diagnostic 
outcomes was a categorical variable  measured on a Likert scale assessing the degree of 
doctors’ agreement with the proposition that diagnostic software reduced misdiagnosis. 
Distributed cognition: Distributed cognition is computation that is “part of the 
larger system of decision-making” (Hazlehurst, Gorman, & McMullen, 2008, p. 11). 
Thus, a doctor working to make a diagnosis with the help of his or her ratiocination, a 
medical manual, and a software interface would be part of a three-component system of 
distributed cognition.  
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Intuition, sometimes referred to as experiential intuition, was defined by Duggan 
(2005) in the following way: 
[Decision-makers] study a situation (Step A), and the problem and solution come 
to them at the same time (Step B). They think through the implications to arrive at 
a course of action (Step C), and then commit to it, or reject it if they think it will 
not work (Step D). In all four steps, they look for patterns of similarity and 
difference with other situations they have lived or learned about. (p. 9) 
There are many variant definitions of intuition, but, in this study, Duggan’s definition 
will be used.  
 Planned behavior: Planned behavior is a model of human action in which, 
according to Herath (2010), it is possible to “explain human actions by understanding the 
following inputs and the interactions between them: Individual beliefs; collective beliefs; 
beliefs about beliefs; and motivation” (p. 317). Planned behavior is thus a construct to 
explain human actions that consists of elements of rationality, social determinism, and 
classic behaviorism (Skinner, 1938). The planned behavior model (Herath, 2010) will be 
explained further in Chapter 2.  
 Representativeness heuristic: The representativeness heuristic (or problem-
solving method) is the form of “cognitive bias that bases decisions based on available 
data rather than on all data, or at least a larger body of data” (Zilberberg, 2011, p. 69). 
Thus, for example, a doctor who has treated four patients in a row who have the same 
extremely rare disease might overestimate the actual prevalence of this disease among the 
general population.      
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Satisficing: Satisficing is a form of decision-making, sometimes employed by 
doctors that was originated by Simon (1947) and defined by Garnham and Oakhill (1994) 
as follows:   
A satisficer recognizes that making the best decision is a time-consuming process, 
and that the difference between a satisfactory decision and the best one will 
probably not justify the effort of computing utilities. In satisficing, a criterion is 
set for a satisfactory decision and the first alternative that meets that criterion is 
accepted…Satisficing is a simpler procedure than computing and comparing 
utilities, since the decision maker has simply to compare alternatives with the 
criterion, as they are encountered (p. 186).  
 Software: Software consists of “lines of instruction, written in a computer 
language, that  direct a machine (or other software) to take a particular action” (Madhavji, 
2006, p. 11).  
Assumptions 
One of the key assumptions of the study was that the results could be generalized, 
applied, and would demonstrate significant value. Another key assumption in this study 
was that doctors are able to introspect validly on the nature of their interaction with 
technology.   My third assumption of this study was that the participants in the survey 
voluntarily provided honest responses to the best of their knowledge and understanding. 
My final assumption of this study was that doctors who reply to the survey are 
representative of non busy doctors rather than busy doctors. 
10 
 
Limitations 
The main limitation of this study was the small sample size. Physicians work 
under intense time constraints and are difficult to recruit (Creswell, 2009). It is likely, 
therefore, that the results are not highly generalizable to the entire population of 
American doctors. Another limitation of the study was that only computer software 
would be part of the study, as distinct from other forms of medical technology. This 
limitation means that some aspects of the doctor-technology system of distributed 
cognition were not examined.  
Scope and Delimitations 
This quantitative study involved the use of a web-based survey to collect data on 
the relationship between the unchanged rates of misdiagnosis in the United States and the 
use or nonuse of diagnostic software. I delimited the study to a randomly selected sub 
population of 3,100 AMA-accredited, licensed, and practicing American doctors.  
Significance of the Study 
Given the human costs of misdiagnosis, the rising economic costs of healthcare, 
and society’s increasing impatience with substandard medical treatment, the use of 
diagnostic software represents a possible solution to both cost and efficiency problems 
that are widely noted in the literature (Capps, Dranove, & Lindrooth, 2010; Skinner, 
2011; Yong, Saunders, & Olsen, 2010). The fact that the prevalence of misdiagnosis has 
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software requires further 
analysis. This information can be useful to multiple stakeholders interested in improving 
hospitals’ diagnostic performance, including healthcare policy-makers, hospital 
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administrators, physicians, and software engineers. The social change implications of 
such improvement are significant, as it can result in fewer patient deaths from 
misdiagnosis and in this sense serve all patients reliant on accurate diagnosis for good 
medical outcomes.   
Summary and Transition 
It is unlikely that the pressures on healthcare economics will ease in the near 
future, especially as much of the developed world enters a period in which the majority of 
its population will be aged and ill or under immediate threat of illness (Mankiw, 2011). It 
is all the more necessary to understand why diagnostic accuracy has not substantially 
improved, especially given that diagnoses are such an important predictor of the quality 
and speed of subsequent healthcare (Simel & Rennie, 2008). In this study, I examined 
whether physicians think there is a connection between diagnostic software use and 
misdiagnosis. 
 Because healthcare costs are spiraling out of control all over the world (Krugman 
& Wells, 2009; Mankiw 2011), any cost-efficient and feasible improvement in diagnostic 
efficiency would be a welcome development, as such improvements lower the overall 
cost of healthcare (Cleverly et al., 2010). 
In Chapter 2 of this study, I present not only the review of the literature but also 
the theoretical foundation for the study and link the literature to the key variables and 
concepts. I build upon the foundation of theories and empirical studies that apply to 
diagnostics in medicine, with a special emphasis on scholarly work about doctors’ and 
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diagnostic software’s decision-making processes. I establish the need to research the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Overview of the Literature Review 
 The purpose of this study was to draw upon physician-provided data to determine 
why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has remained high 
despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. The problem addressed in the 
study was the prevalence of high levels of misdiagnosis (Leavitt & Leavitt, 2011) despite 
an adoption rate for diagnostic software that is between 55 and 70% (Chernick, 2011; 
Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011).  Throughout the literature, authors have suggested that 
diagnostic software does indeed have the ability to both assist physicians with their 
diagnoses and to provide sound diagnoses in its own right in a manner that will be 
examined later in the chapter. The questions that do not appear to be addressed in the 
literature are whether physicians are using diagnostic software frequently and expertly 
enough to avail themselves of its benefits. 
Literature Search Strategy 
In order to investigate what previous literature has stated about this topic, 
searches for medical misdiagnosis, diagnostic software, diagnostic technology, physician 
opinions and diagnostic software, and distributed cognition in healthcare were conducted 
on the EBSCO Host, Science Direct, Google Scholar, and ProQuest databases. Older 
literature was included in the literature review because there are seminal theories of 
diagnosis and diagnostic technology. The extensive literature on the utility, or lack of 
utility, of diagnostic software exemplifies how the search strings and associated review of 
studies disclosed the existence of only a few studies (for example, Dreiseitl, 2005) that 
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drew on a sample of physicians to answer the question of why misdiagnosis remains so 
prevalent despite the sophistication and widespread adoption of diagnostic technology.       
The Science of Diagnosis 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2011) defined diagnosis as the “determination of 
the nature of a diseased condition; identification of a disease by careful investigation of 
its symptoms and history; also, the opinion (formally stated) resulting from such 
investigation” (para. 1). Diagnosis has Greek roots; in ancient Greek, the roots are “δια- 
through, thoroughly, asunder + γιγνώσκειν to learn to know, perceive” (Oxford English 
Dictionary). Thus, diagnosis suggests the acquisition of thorough knowledge.  
In the Western medical tradition, the first great study of medicine was the 
Hippocratic Corpus (Kelly, 2010), the name given to the collected writings of 
Hippocrates (an ancient Greek physician, known as the father of medicine, who lived 
from 460 B.C.E. to 370 B.C.E.). The Hippocratic Corpus, over 70 medical treatises 
written by Hippocrates or his students in the 5
th
 and 4
th
 centuries B.C.E., is the earliest 
surviving and scientific discussion of diagnostic science (Renouard, 2010), and is, 
therefore, an appropriate starting point for any discussion of diagnostics. According to 
Hippocrates, diagnosis has the following components: (a) gathering of evidence, 
including physical evidence and verbal evidence (gathered from speaking to the patient) 
pertaining to a patient’s symptoms; (b) fitting knowledge about the symptoms to a 
specific disease, whether known or postulated; (c) determining the most appropriate 
treatment for the disease; and (d) fine-tuning the treatment based on ongoing observations 
of the interaction between the patient and the proposed treatment. This process is 
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discussed at length in “On Regimen in Acute Diseases,” when Hippocrates (Adams, 
1849), writing in the 5
th
 century BCE, used the word diagnosis for the first time in 
writing (p. 282). Adams, who provided a translation of the Hippocratic Corpus in 1849, 
argued that Hippocrates’ model of diagnosis remained highly influential: “Hippocrates 
and his followers…in a great measure anticipated all the results of modern diagnosis” (p. 
307). 
One of the revolutions in diagnostic science in the age of contemporary medicine 
was the study, analysis, and categorization of a vast number of diseases, which scientists 
were often able to understand on a molecular and genetic level (Bynum, 2008; Cunha, 
2011). The vast accumulation of knowledge of disease meant that, over time, the 
diagnostic process became oriented to fitting observed symptoms to already-known 
diseases; after all, by the end of the end of the 20
th
 century, the variations of disease were 
comprehensively understood, and the task of diagnosticians focused on fitting symptoms 
to disease (Hodler, Schulthess, & Zolikofer, 2011).  
Hippocrates (as cited in Adams, 1849), for his part, placed equal emphasis on 
observed symptoms and grand etiological theories that were intended to explain the 
ultimate origins of disease. This emphasis steadily fell away by the Middle Ages. Hersen 
and Thomas (2006) described the key post-Hippocratic developments in diagnostic 
science as follows:  
Throughout the classical era, diagnoses were made based on presumed etiology, 
as when Hippocrates rooted the illnesses he diagnosed (mania, melancholia, and 
paranoia) in various imbalances of black bile, yellow bile, blood, and 
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phlegm…Basing diagnostic assessments on such etiologic conceits changed only 
when the Swiss physician and natural philosopher Paracelsus (1490-1541) 
developed the concept of syndromal diagnosis. Paracelsus defined the syndrome 
as a group of signs and symptoms that co-occur in a common pattern and thereby, 
presumably, characterize a particular abnormality or disease state, but for which 
etiology is unknown, perhaps unknowable. Syndromal diagnosis is epitomized 
today in the DSM, which continues its focus on the signs and symptoms of 
diseases, rather than presumed etiologies, which are unnecessary for diagnostic 
purposes (p. 4).  
As Hensen and Thomas (2006) wrote from the perspective of psychology and 
psychiatry, their reference to the DSM—the abbreviation for the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—does not apply to all of medicine. However, the 
concept of syndromal diagnosis and the accompanying importance of evidence-based, 
empirical pattern recognition and fitting symptoms to diseases do indeed characterize the 
entire tradition of modern Western medicine, also known as biomedicine (Hughes, 2011). 
Of course, it is not necessary to agree, along with Hensen and Thomas, that Hippocrates’s 
emphasis on etiology, or the study of the causes of diseases, lessened the importance of 
the Hippocratic practice of diagnosis and symptom fitting. Robson and Baek (2009) 
argued that Hippocrates’s belief in no etiological concepts (such as the belief that the 
color and volume of bodily fluids determined aspects of personality) should not distract 
attention from the remarkably modern paradigm of Hippocratic diagnosis. Hess, 
MacIntyre, and Mishoe (2011) pointed out that Hippocrates’s diagnosis of digital 
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clubbing could stand alongside modern examples of sound diagnosis. Regardless of the 
role of etiology, the next steps in diagnostic science are straightforward. After fitting 
symptoms to a disease, the diagnostic authority either administers or recommends the 
administration of some treatment (Carpenito-Moyet, 2008).  
There are many kinds of treatments, including pharmacological treatments, 
surgery, and other interventions (such as radiation; Foster, 2010). Whatever the precise 
composition of a treatment, the next and final stage in the diagnostic model is to monitor 
what happens to the patient so that a treatment can be modified if necessary or carried 
through to the termination of a patient’s symptoms (Monahan, Neighbors, & Green, 
2010).  
For example, the post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnostic guidelines 
contain reference material on which a human doctor or diagnostic software could draw to 
make a diagnosis of PTSD. In this case, for a diagnosis of PTSD to be reached, the 
patient has to present with a specific set of symptoms spread across criteria A-F as shown 
in Table 1. However, even though PTSD is a highly studied disease with a known 
etiology and biological mechanisms (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), there is 
still room for ambiguity and discretion in making this diagnosis based on the diagnostic 
guidelines for PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 256) in Table 1.   
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Table 1  
DSM Criteria for PTSD  
Criterion Description 
 
A: Stressor 
 
The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have been present: 
(1)The person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with an event or events that involve 
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others. 
(2) The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in children, it may be 
expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior. 
 
B:Intrusive 
Recollection 
 
The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways: 
(1) Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or 
perceptions. Note: in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the 
trauma are expressed. (2) Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: in children, there may be 
frightening dreams without recognizable content. (3) Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were 
recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative 
flashback episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Note: in 
children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur. (4) Intense psychological distress at exposure to 
internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. (5) Physiologic 
reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the 
traumatic event 
 
C:Avoidant / 
Numbing 
Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness 
(not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following: (1) Efforts to avoid 
thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma. (2) Efforts to avoid activities, places, 
or people that arouse recollections of the trauma. (3) Inability to recall an important aspect of the 
trauma. (4) Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities. (5) Feeling of 
detachment or estrangement from others. (6) Restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving 
feelings). (7) Sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, 
children, or a normal life span). 
 
D:Hyper-
Arousal  
Persistent symptoms of increasing arousal (not present before the trauma), indicated by at least two 
of the following: (1) Difficulty falling or staying asleep. (2) Irritability or outbursts of anger. (3) 
Difficulty concentrating. (4) Hyper-vigilance. (5) Exaggerated startle response. 
 
E: Duration Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is more than one month. 
 
F: Functional 
Significance 
The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning. Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than three months; Chronic: if 
duration of symptoms is three months or more. 
 
With or Without delay onset: Onset of symptoms at least six months after the stressor. 
 
 
Specify if: 
Note. Adapted from American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual 
of mental disorders, fourth edition, text revision. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, (2000, p. 256). 
 
According to the American Psychiatric Association, at least two of the following 
five symptoms should be present in a PTSD-diagnosed patient: “(a) Difficulty falling or 
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staying asleep, (b) Irritability or outbursts of anger, (c) Difficulty concentrating, (d) 
Hyper-vigilance, (e) Exaggerated startle response” (p. 256). However, there are cases of 
patients with PTSD who have exhibited only one of these symptoms (American 
Psychiatric Association, p. 256). This example shows the potential inexactitude of 
diagnostic science, regardless of the revolutionary advances that have occurred in 
medicine since the time of Hippocrates.  
One of the problems of diagnosis is that patients can be radically different from 
each other, and therefore diseases can manifest themselves in different ways in different 
patients (Winkelman, 2008). However, diagnostic science is not designed to 
accommodate variation but rather to look for generalities and laws (Winkelman, 2008). 
Thus, as in the American Psychiatric Association’s (2000) discussion of the symptoms of 
PTSD, statistical generalities have to be used in order to construct a portrait of the most 
common type of PTSD patient. In real life, PTSD patients might not conveniently display 
the symptoms that other patients have had, but they might suffer from PTSD all the same. 
Thus, in diagnostic science, there is a constant pull between the academic need to reach 
general conclusions about disease contrasted with the practical necessity of remembering 
that patients and their symptoms can be highly idiosyncratic (Winkelman, 2008).  
The way of diagnostic science presented thus far in the literature review is what 
Lock and Nguyen (2011) called the consensus view of biomedicine. However, there are 
other views as well. Some scholars, for instance, have tried to argue that the diagnostic 
process is not merely a kind of science but also a cultural practice that is laden with 
inherent social values. Byrne (2012) offered a powerful recent articulation of this point of 
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view: “Social construction recognizes that disease is not merely a biological fact but is an 
artifact of social interpretation. Diseases have meanings. Homosexuality used to be 
considered a disease; catching a cold and catching herpes are somehow different” (pp. 2-
3). According to Byrne 2012; Freidson 1970; Schneider and Conrad 1981  who 
emphasize the social construction of disease, there is temptation to think of diagnostic 
science as somehow distinct from the society in which it takes place. However, there is a 
strong argument to be made that, because the concept of disease is itself fluid and 
culturally relative, so too diagnostic science should be fluid. Fadiman’s (1998) book-
length account of the diagnosis of a child of Hmong ethnicity in California chronicles the 
value-laden nature of Western medicine, or biomedicine, when it comes into conflict with 
other traditions of belief and medicine. While issues of social construction will not be 
considered in this study, it is nonetheless important to be aware of the limits of diagnostic 
science. 
The science of diagnosis as it is understood in contemporary times can, relying on 
the authorities whose work was discussed above, be summarized as follows. Diagnosis 
begins with some form of evidence collection, typically relying on a combination of 
physical evidence (such as a patient’s blood) and the patient’s own subjective and 
phenomenological accounts of illness, some of which can be overlaid with social and 
cultural values. This evidence is then synthesized into a set of symptoms, that is, 
observable problems and abnormalities. Next, the diagnostician moves toward fitting the 
symptoms to a known disease and consults some established authority—including 
personal experience of past patients’ symptoms, current analysis of an individual 
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patient’s symptoms, or a reference guide (such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders or diagnostic textbooks that address specific fields such as 
autoimmune disease, musculoskeletal disease, or other areas)—to decide upon a suitable 
form of treatment. Finally, the patient is monitored to determine whether the chosen 
treatment is proving to be effective, or whether further modifications to the treatment 
plan are needed. With this nutshell definition of the scientific process in diagnosis serving 
as a foundation, it is possible to try to theoretically model what is known of diagnostics.        
A Brief Overview of American Healthcare: Diagnostic Issues 
Diagnosis is a process that is driven by the kinds of diseases with which a 
population is faced. In the United States, the most common terminal diseases are listed in 
Table 2 (Centers for Disease Control, 2012, p. 3); these diseases are more commonly 
diagnosed than, for example, the kinds of infectious diseases that are more prevalent in 
the Global South.  
Table 2 
Main Leading Causes of Death in the U.S. 
Causes of death Annual victims 
Heart disease 616,067 
Cancer 562,875 
Stroke or cerebrovascular disease 135,952 
Chronic lower respiratory illness 127,924 
Accidents or unintentional injuries 123,706 
Alzheimer’s disease 74,632 
Diabetes 71,382 
Influenza and pneumonia 52,717 
Nephritis or nephrosis 46,448 
Septicemia 41,144 
 
Note. Adapted from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Death and Mortality. 
NCHS Web site.http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm. Accessed May 20, 2012  
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Thus, as can be seen from Table 2, the most common diagnoses in the United 
States are for heart disease and cancer. Overall, medical scholars have argued that the 
United States is a classic example of a developed country in which there has been a shift 
in the burden of disease, away from infectious diseases to so-called lifestyle diseases 
(Caperchione, Kolt, & Mummery, 2009). Whereas 19th-century Americans were 
routinely killed by infections, Americans now tend to die because of health problems that 
emerge from a highly sedentary and inactive national lifestyle (Edlin & Golanty, 2009). 
Thus, the vast majority of cases that present to American doctors have to do with heart 
disease, cancer, and other diseases that have come to predominate in the developed world 
(Edlin & Golanty, 2009). 
There is currently no national clearinghouse of data for American diagnostic 
statistics. However, different sources in the literature offer insight into the state of 
American diagnostics. The outlook is decidedly mixed in terms of the quality and 
timeliness of diagnostic decisions. The New York City Comptroller, Liu (2011) released 
a report indicating that many New York City hospitals had what the comptroller called 
“dangerously long waiting times” (para. 1) for diagnostic mammograms. In one New 
York City hospital, the average wait for a diagnostic mammogram in 2011 was 50 
working days (Liu, 2011). Given that there are tens of thousands of discrete diagnostic 
procedures and many thousands of hospitals in the United States, it is not possible to 
offer an overview of the national healthcare system’s diagnostic efficiency; however, 
some general conclusions can still be reached. In his report on mammogram waiting 
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times, Liu noted that the healthcare system of New York City was characterized by wide 
disparities in the speed of diagnosis; while one hospital in the Queens borough took 50 
working days to order diagnostic mammograms, there were other hospitals and clinics in 
New York City where this procedure could be ordered and completed in a single day 
(Liu, 2011). 
The conclusion is that the American healthcare system is highly variable with 
respect to diagnostic efficiency. One trend is that publicly-funded hospitals, especially 
hospitals in urban centers, are perpetually under budget pressure and have developed 
dysfunctional operational cultures, resulting in the long-delayed diagnoses noted by Liu 
(2011) and other observers (Trautman, 2011). Another trend is that wealthier Americans 
are able to opt out of bottom-tier care by hiring concierge doctors, purchasing better 
health insurance policies, and patronizing private clinics (Stillman, 2010). For this 
reason, there are wide disparities in the quality and timeliness of diagnostic procedures 
depending on the hospital, the precise diagnostic procedure, and the city in which 
services are provided. These disparities are far less pronounced in countries with robust 
public medicine programs; in the United Kingdom, for example, wait times for medical 
diagnostic procedures are essentially standardized so that anyone who attends a 
healthcare facility associated with the National Health Service (NHS) can expect to 
receive diagnoses in the same timeframe, and of the same quality, regardless of which 
healthcare facility is chosen (Dimakou, Parkin, Devlin, & Appleby, 2010). 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that in the United States, diagnosis of disease 
is not only a scientific process but also a market phenomenon that is affected by the 
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American healthcare financing system and various market pressures. For example, recent 
years have seen the rise of the phenomenon of diagnostic outsourcing, in which 
physicians in another country—India is a popular destination, given the rigor of medical 
education and language commonalities—are paid to diagnose diseases by looking at x-
rays and other forms of patient data (Schneirdjans, Schneirdjans, & Schneirdjans, 2007). 
The purpose of this brief overview of some diagnostic trends and issues in 
American healthcare has been to offer a context for some of the implications that will be 
drawn, and recommendations that will be advanced in Chapter 5.  Clearly, diagnostic 
processes are part of a larger market system, and recommendations about how diagnostic 
processes can be improved ought to be grounded in an acknowledgement of that reality.        
A Theoretical Model of Diagnosis 
In order to think more deeply about what diagnosis is, how it functions, and how 
it might vary depending on whether the diagnostician is a doctor or software, it is 
necessary to suggest and defend a more general theory of diagnosis. First, diagnosis 
appears to be a high-level cognitive skill. Additionally, because diagnosis is the basis for 
some form of intervention in the physical world (such as the administration of a drug or 
the initiation of a surgery), it also has a component of action. Formally speaking, 
diagnosis is what Linehan (1993) called cognitive-verbal behavior, which “includes such 
activities as thinking, problem solving, perceiving, imaging, speaking, writing, and 
gestural communication” (p. 17), all of which are activities that have been shown to be 
inalienable parts of the diagnostic process (Foster, 2010; Hess, MacIntyre, & Mishoe, 
2011; Hughes, 2011). It makes sense, therefore, that a theoretical model of cognitive-
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verbal behavior could also serve as a theoretical model of diagnosis itself. One promising 
model of behavior is the planned behavior model of Herath (2010). The planned behavior 
model as a five-stage model of what goes on between the formation of a diagnostic belief 
and the transformation of that belief into actual diagnostic behavior, such as the issuance 
of a prescription recommendation as shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3 
Five Levels of Herath’s (2010) Planned Behavior Model 
Level Description Relation to 
other levels 
 
1 
 
1a Behavioral beliefs: Beliefs formed by the individual out of a personal 
process of rational, purposive thinking. 
 
1b Normative beliefs: Beliefs considered normal; highly accepted beliefs 
within a culture or sub-culture. 
 
1c Control beliefs: Beliefs about beliefs (for example, judgments about the 
soundness of a belief) 
 
1a leads to 2a; 
1b leads to 2b; 
1c leads to 2c  
 
2 
 
2a Attitudes: Attitudes are more concrete beliefs; they imply some 
intention to act in a certain way. 
 
2b Subjective norms: Subjective norms are the collective knowledge of 
authority (for example, a medical manual). 
 
2c Perceived behavioral control: An individual’s belief about his or her 
ability to control and direct her beliefs.  
 
2a, 2b, and 2c all 
lead to 3a. 
 
3 
 
3a Behavioral intention: A disposition to act in a particular way.  
 
3a interacts with 
4a and 4b and 
leads to 5 
 
4 
 
4a Intrinsic motivation: A desire to act in a particular way based on 
personal reasons. 
 
4b Extrinsic motivation: A desire to act in a particular way based on 
external, non-personal reasons. 
 
 
4a and 4b are 
variables that 
mediate or 
moderate between 
3a and 5a, and 
also between 2a, 
2b,  2c and 3a 
 
5 
 
5a Actual behavior 
 
Outcome of 
previous levels 
 
Note. Synthesized from Eliciting Salient Beliefs are Critical to Predict Behavioural 
Change in Theory of Planned Behavior Herath (2010). 
 
Table 3 offers more detail on what these five levels are and how they interact; it 
should be noted that the descriptions of each level are broad paraphrases of Herath (2010) 
that have been modified to account specifically for diagnosis (for example, medical 
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manuals were given as an example of subjective norms, an example that does not appear 
in Herath’s own discussion of the model. The Planned Behavior Model has the 
advantages of strength, flexibility, and alignment with the existing literature on diagnosis. 
It also addresses a question that the model of distributed cognition does not, which is 
exactly how the human components of decision-making work within a broader welter of 
influences from society, the individual mind, and the environment (which includes 
diagnostic software). The only potentially complex aspect of the model is the role of 
motivation. Herath argued that, in previous versions of the Planned Behavior Model 
(such as the seminal version of the model created by Ajzen, 2005), researchers had failed 
to take adequate account of the role of motivation. In order words, according to Herath, 
researchers assumed that behavioral intentions—formed by the inputs in levels 1 and 2 of 
Table3—led straightforwardly to actual behavior (as was the case in Ajzen’s original 
model). However, Herath argued that motivation was an important intermediate variable. 
This point can be illustrated by means of an example. Even if a doctor were to arrive at a 
behavioral intention to diagnose a particular drug as a result of beliefs and attitudes that 
strongly supported the prescription of that drug, a powerful kind of motivation—for 
example, the doctor’s knowledge of, and guilt about, the fact that a previous patient on 
the same drug died—could cause the doctor to revise and reject the rational process of 
attitude formation. Thus, by making an accommodation for the role of motivation, 
Herath’s Planned Behavior Model can accommodate both rational and irrational 
behavior. Herath’s Planned Behavioral Model also provides an underpinning for one of 
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the independent variables of the study, the use of diagnostic software, by grounding the 
decision to use such software in a rationalistic framework of choice. 
Before examining how the Planned Behavior Model accommodates existing 
features of diagnostic science, a few further points about the model ought to be made. To 
begin with, variations of this model are often used to analyze patients’ intentions to adopt 
health behaviors (Reneman, Geertzen, Groothoff, & Brouwer, 2008). However, as Herath 
(2010) pointed out, the Planned Behavior Model is population-agnostic, and can be 
applied to any human decision-making process. Second, it is also often the case that the 
Planned Behavior Model is used to model behavior that will take place weeks, months, or 
even years in the future (Li, Frieze, & Tang, 2010). However, the Planned Behavior 
Model can be applied to any decision that takes place more than a few seconds after the 
initial stimulus (Herath, 2010). Thus, the ways in which the Planned Behavior Model has 
historically been used in medical research should not be taken as limitations of the model 
itself. Having explained why the model might be useful to researchers interested in 
diagnostic behavior, it is natural to offer more detail on how and why the Planned 
Behavior Model fits with diagnostic science. Such a discussion, while being useful in its 
own right, will also serve as a foundation for a discussion of differences between human 
and machine diagnosis.   
In order to understand how the Planned Behavior Model is a good description of 
what takes place in diagnosis, and thereby to set the stage for understanding how human 
and machine diagnosis are different, consider that diagnosis itself can be broken into 
three components: computation, satisficing, and intuition. In this section of the literature 
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review, each of these components will be discussed on their own, after which the 
components’ relevance to the Planned Behavior Model will be discussed in a separate 
section.    
Computation 
Computation at its most basic level can be understood as the use of mathematical 
processes to arrive at an output from an input (Berstein, 2011). There are two widely 
recognized forms of computation. In the mathematical model of computation, an input is 
transformed via a function; once the initial input is given, there are no additional steps, 
and the input and output are distinct from each other. In the engineering model of 
computation, inputs and outputs can be entangled, such that they interact with each other, 
and the computation is revised accordingly (Meyers, 2011). In terms of outputs 
themselves, computations have two forms: They can be closed and exhaustive, or they 
can have a confidence level. For example, the computation that 2 + 2 = 4 is a closed and 
exhaustive computation; the degree of certainty that the output follows from the inputs is 
absolute (Adam, 2011). An example of a kind of computation that is based on a 
confidence level is a forecast based on a Poisson distribution (Babu, 2011). For example, 
if one tries to forecast how many red cars will arrive at a stop sign based on previous 
observations of the sign, the forecast will always be an estimate; statistical methods can 
be used to indicate how much confidence researchers should have in the forecast. 
As it can be imagined, computation in medical diagnosis tends toward confidence 
levels rather than absolutely certainty (Chernick, 2011). It is hardly ever the case that 
doctors think of a particular set of symptoms as absolutely indicative of a certain disease; 
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because of the complexity of disease, the fallibility of the process of matching symptoms 
to diseases, and other unforeseen variables—such as patients who lie about their 
symptoms—doctors prefer not to think of diagnoses as being absolutely certain or 
uncertain (First & Tasman, 2011). Additionally, because diagnosis contains a built-in 
process of monitoring and, if necessary, adjusting the treatment, diagnosis can be thought 
as a kind of engineering computation rather than as a kind of mathematical computation 
(McGann & Hutson, 2011). 
Thus, having set aside mathematical computation, closed calculations, and 
absolute certainty as concepts that apply infrequently to medical diagnosis (Chernick, 
2011; First & Tasman, 2011; McGann & Hutson, 2011), it would be useful to spend more 
time understanding how confidence levels and engineering computation function in 
diagnostic science. How, then, does computation function in diagnosis science? To begin 
with, the treatment (alongside the symptoms) should be thought of as the input, and the 
result as the output. Doctors wish to be as certain as they can be that a particular input 
will lead to the output of wellness (Nuttall & Rutt-Howard, 2011), however it is defined 
(e.g., cessation of symptoms, patient’s self-reported health, etc.). In the process of 
computation, then, the goal of the doctor is to be as sure as possible that the input of 
treatment leads to the output of health (Bath-Hextall, Lymn, & Knaggs, 2011). The 
problem is: How can the doctor find the most appropriate input? 
In computational terms, one solution to the problem is what is known as a 
decision tree. In a decision tree, the computing system—whether it is a human, a 
computer, or a human using a computer—works through all of the available forking paths 
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on an if-then basis: That is, calculating if a particular decision is taken, what will its 
utility be? (Bekkerman, Bilenko, & Langford, 2011). Chess computers provide a simple 
example of decision trees. In deciding how to make a chess move, chess computers 
employ decision trees to calculate the respective costs and benefits of all available moves, 
or as many moves as the computer’s central processing unit (CPU) can model. Current 
supercomputers can calculate the costs and benefits of trillions of moves in just a few 
seconds (Nielsen, 2011). Of course, calculations of this sort are based on a confidence 
level; there is no one right move, but rather a move that is rated higher than other moves 
(Lefrancois, 2011).  
In the world of the physician, one use of the computational decision tree is to 
match observed symptoms to any number of diseases that could fit the symptoms. In 
some cases, such a decision tree might be small; for example, some patients have 
symptoms that are highly typical of a handful of diseases, prompting the doctor to take a 
closer look at those diseases and their possible connection to the symptoms (Clavien & 
Trotter, 2011). In other cases, a symptom could be typical of hundreds, or even 
thousands, of known diseases (Reiss, Shadomy, & Lyon, 2011). In such a case, a so-
called brute force computational approach would be to examine every one of the possible 
diseases for further evidence of matching symptoms; in the actual practice of medicine, 
however, it is more common for doctors to collect more data that can narrow down the 
number of diseases with which a symptom might be associated (Gifford, 2011).  
One interesting computational study was that of Martin, Perez, and Muller’s 
(2009), which analyzed the role of Bayesian statistics in medical decision-making. As 
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Martin et al. pointed out, diagnosing a disease can be highly dependent on when a patient 
is examined, and when particular data is collected from the patient. According to Martin 
et al., some diseases progress in a more or less random fashion, meaning that more 
regular sampling of a patient’s condition might be necessary to reach a proper diagnosis. 
On the other hand, some diseases proceed in an almost linear fashion, creating urgency 
for the doctor to move from the process of gathering evidence to the process of 
administering a treatment to effect a cure. Martin et al. argued that there is an obvious 
computational role for diagnostic software that can accurately estimate, on behalf of a 
doctor, when data should be gathered from a patient, and calculate the significance of 
gathered data. Martin et al.’s discussion emphasized the rising importance of statistical 
analysis in modern medicine, and argued that software performs more accurately than 
doctors in determining when patients should be monitored for particular diseases. As 
Martin et al., argued, even if physicians perform this kind of statistical analysis 
themselves, the act of doing so might deplete valuable time and energy that the physician 
needs for more cure-oriented actions. Thus, Martin et al. concluded that there appears to 
be a clear role for diagnostic software in making statistical calculations about when to 
gather patient data, and deciding the statistical significance of the gathered data.      
Whereas Martin et al. (2009) discussed the specific computational utility of 
diagnostic software at a specific stage of diagnosis (evidence collection), Schwab (2008) 
made a more general point about the advantages of computation that has to do with 
heuristics, which is defined as “a method of solving problems that puts aside belief in 
things like causality and argumentation from the known to the unknown” (Bowman & 
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Frega, 2012, p. 348). In an article about the limits of medical decision-making, Schwab 
pointed out that “human judgment is governed by generally expedient heuristics (a 
flipped coin will come up heads half the time) that lead to predictable biases (people 
expect a flipped coin to land heads, then tails, then heads, then tails, etc.)” (p. 1861). 
Doctors are not immune to what Schwab called the heuristics and biases theory of 
decision-making. The heart of the problem is that, as Schwab put it, human psychology is 
committed to “sense-making processes” (p. 1865). All humans have some bias toward the 
need for events, actions, and behaviors to make sense. Computation does not have this 
bias; it is agnostic to the various decision-making fallacies enumerated by Schwab. Thus, 
in addition to serving the kind of positive utility described by Martin et al., it is also 
possible that computation as it applies to diagnostic decision-making has a negative 
utility: By rooting diagnosis in statistics, computation prevents doctors from committing 
cognitive errors related to the innate human desire for sense and meaning.      
Another discussion of the fallibility of physician decision-making and the 
superiority of the computational approach appeared in Gorini and Pravettoni’s (2011) 
recent article on cognitive bias in the diagnostic process. Goritni and Pravettoni identified 
two important flaws in physician decision-making; heuristic bias (which was also 
discussed by Schwab, 2008) and under-reliance on the statistical likelihood of disease: 
…physicians often use [representative heuristics] to match symptoms of the 
patient against prototypes or mental templates of diagnoses. However, relying on 
the representativeness heuristic can lead a diagnostician to only look at and search 
for the prototypical manifestations of a disease. This can lead to an incorrect or 
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delayed diagnosis when aspects of a patient's presentation are atypical. In some 
instances, the reliance on the representativeness heuristic leads to a ‘base-rate 
neglect’. Base-rate neglect includes the failure to adequately take into account the 
prevalence of a particular disease. When the true prevalence of a disease is 
ignored, it may lead to the overestimation of improbable diagnoses, which, in 
turn, is disadvantageous for the patient and can result in an over-utilization of 
resources (p. 548). 
 Because diagnostic calculation is probabilistic, diagnostic software programs do 
not succumb to the representativeness heuristic; as will be discussed later in the literature 
review, software programs offer likelihoods, not certainties, and computation cannot be 
misled by the motivation to fit symptoms to diseases in a particular and biased way. 
Additionally, because computation is non-emotional reasoning, relying on diagnostic 
computations is warranted when either physicians are trying to get an idea of the 
likelihood of a disease, quite apart from how the patient or the physician would feel about 
seeing a diagnosis revealed as accurate or inaccurate. For these reasons, the software 
engineers Gorini and Pravettoni (2011) defended the use of diagnostic software and other 
forms of computational decision-making in the diagnostic context. 
On the other hand, as Bucknall (2010) argued in a recent article on the nature of 
medical error in emergency diagnoses, computation also has its limits. According to 
Bucknall, “80% of medical error results from system flaws” (p. 152), with the system 
defined as the sum of human, machine, and process inputs. Thus, for example, it is of 
little use to employ diagnostic software to indicate the best blood sampling times to test 
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for a certain disease when the patient cannot be reached by the hospital, or has not been 
directed to follow up. One of the implications of Bucnkall’s argument is that, while 
diagnostic software is excellent at computational tasks, these tasks in themselves do not 
significantly reduce the innate risk of medical error, because they take place within an 
existing system. If that system is flawed, then so is the utility of diagnostic software. At 
the same time, Bucknall argued that the value of doctors lies in their ability to step 
outside a flawed system, a quality that Bucknall considered an extremely important 
component of diagnostic success in emergency medicine in particular. Another 
implication of Bucknall’s work is that a physician’s knowledge of certain aspects of 
diagnostic software, one of the independent variables of the study, can affect the ultimate 
efficacy of diagnostic software. 
Another limitation of computation is that computation becomes more complicated 
once a decision tree has already been generated and followed to a conclusion (Segal & 
Shahar, 2009). For example, if a doctor has used computational methods to identify six 
diseases with which a symptom might be compatible, there are diminishing returns to 
further computation. At some point, doctors might not be able to reduce the possible 
number of symptom-matching diseases; in addition to the obvious limitations on time that 
exist in many diagnostic environments (such as an emergency room in a busy urban 
environment), evidence itself is limited (Croskerry, Cosby, & Schenkel, & Wears, 2008). 
When a doctor runs out of tests and other diagnostic aids, and is still left with a handful 
of diseases that match the patient’s symptoms, other diagnostic skills have to be called 
upon. One of these skills is known as satisficing. 
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Satisficing 
To return to the previous example, imagine that a doctor has identified six 
diseases with which a given patient’s symptoms are consistent, and that there is no 
further use for computational roles in determining precisely what disease the patient 
might be suffering from. What can a doctor do? Garnham and Oakhill (1994) provided 
one possible answer as follows: The doctor, following the principle of satisficing, could 
simply choose the first diagnostic alternative that met a specified criterion, such as 
accounting for a highly important symptom.   
A doctor starting with a list of six diseases that are equally likely to be responsible 
for a given set of symptoms could thus resort to satisficing by administering a treatment 
for a single disease and watching the result (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). The initial 
treatment would be guided by the use of bounded rationality, meaning that the physician 
would apply his or her existing knowledge to narrow down the possible choices for 
treatment (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). If the treatment for that disease resulted in a 
cessation of the symptoms, then the doctor might assume that the diagnostic process had 
been successful (Groopman, 2007). The choice of which disease to try to treat first is 
driven by any number of considerations. For example, a doctor could try to treat the 
disease that was the most life threatening or that required the earliest intervention. If all 
of the diseases compatible with a patient’s symptoms were equal in their danger, then the 
doctor might randomly choose one of the diseases to try to treat (Montgomery, 2006).  
Satisficing is, in its way, a kind of experimentation. If the experimentation is 
successful, the diagnostic process is over—especially in a medical atmosphere in which 
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there is extreme pressure on doctors to achieve results and move on to the next patient 
(Schwartz & Bergus, 2008). If the experimentation is unsuccessful, however, then 
satisficing can lead back into computation. It was noted earlier in the literature review 
that the engineering model of computation assumes an ongoing interaction between 
inputs and outputs.  If a satisficing doctor noticed that a particular treatment failed to 
result in a cessation of symptoms, but gave rise to a new piece of medical evidence, then 
the computation process could begin again, as the doctor tried to fit new symptoms to a 
disease set (Shaw, Ramachandra, Lucas, & Robinson, 2011). What is more common, 
however, is for doctors to try treatments in turn until they observe cessation of symptoms 
(Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011). Thus, it can be argued that the goal of medical computation 
is to lower the number of possible fits between symptom and disease—ideally, to 1 (that 
is, a unique fit), but sometimes to 2-6 fits, in which the doctor works through different 
possibilities in an experimental manner (Rao, 2007).  
Satisficing has its weaknesses, among them the lack of diagnostic precision 
(Zilberberg, 2011), but also its strengths. One of the strengths of satisficing is the self-
correcting nature of the practice (Simon, 1947). When doctors observe that a diagnosis 
reached through satisficing  is incorrect, they move on pragmatically, factoring other 
knowledge into their diagnostic decisions and subjecting their earlier decisions to more 
critical scrutiny, achieving what Ryan (2010) called reflective inquiry, and what other 
scholars call, more generically, metacognition (Mamede, Rikers, & Schmidt, 2012).    
Satisficing, while proven to be a common tool in the diagnostic arsenal, has 
limitations. Sometimes, especially in emergencies, a doctor might lack the time or the 
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means to try several treatments; at other times, a patient might be too fragile to endure 
several treatments in succession. In cases of this kind, doctors often rely on a third kind 
of diagnostic skill: Intuition. 
Intuition 
Duggan (2005) defined intuition, as it functions for expert and scientifically 
minded decision makers, as a form of decision-making based on “patterns of similarity 
and difference with other situations” (p. 9) experienced by the decision-maker. Intuition 
can be understood as a specific form of physician knowledge not easily rendered into 
diagnostic rules.  
The popular understanding of intuition is that of a sixth sense or some other 
pseudo-mystical capability. However, as Duggan pointed out, intuition as it functions 
among scientific decision-makers are not mystical or frivolous, but rather a diagnostic 
skill rooted in experience. Such experiences can be highly idiosyncratic and resistant to 
computational analysis (Kattan & Cowen, 2009). For example, doctors might have noted 
that many past patients in a particular situation reacted to a particular drug with toxic 
shock, and might thus assume that a current patient in the same situation would respond 
in the same way. The medical literature is replete with examples of intuition as a 
diagnostic skill (Chapman & Sonnenberg, 2003; Flynn & Van Schaik, 2003; Plessner, 
Betsch, & Betsch, 2008). Intuition is often the last diagnostic computation, one that 
comes after computation has been exhausted and satisficing is impossible or deemed too 
risky (Flynn & Van Schaik, 2003). 
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Intuition has another important role in diagnostic science. It also serves as the 
form of introspection that affords doctors a stronger belief in their beliefs, and that leads 
doctors to rely on the received wisdom of medical manuals and the pooled knowledge of 
their profession (Groopman, 2007). In this way, intuition—in combination with 
computation and satisficing—can be directly related to the Planned Behavior Model of 
Herath (2010).    
Recent literature on intuition in medical decision-making has called attention to 
some unique strengths of the human touch. For example, McDermott (2008) pointed out 
that there were many variables in whether or not a patient would accept and comply with 
a specific treatment plan for a diagnosed disease, including “the way treatment options 
are framed and presented” (p. 665) by the doctor and “denial mechanisms” (p. 665).  As 
McDermott argued, diagnostic decisions require patient compliance to be successful. 
Take the case of a patient whom the diagnosing doctor knows to have a particular bias: 
For example, a reluctance to take a medicine that is injected into the bloodstream. In this 
kind of case, diagnostic software would not know which of the available treatments to, as 
it were, pitch to the patient; the doctor’s knowledge of patient context, and skill at 
framing, are required to achieve compliance. Sometimes this aspect of the doctor’s skill 
is not based on a direct judgment about the patient’s compliance, but becomes an innate 
quality built out of thousands of clinical encounters (McDermott, 2008). Software 
designers are striving towards the ability to build a kind of intuition into software using 
expert systems, although, in the context of this study, it remains to be seen what doctors 
think of such systems. 
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Computation, Satisficing, Intuition, and the Planned Behavior Model   
The planned behavior model (Ajzen, 2005; Herath, 2010) was chosen as one of 
the theoretical and conceptual bases for this study because it appeared to be a useful 
account of the entire diagnostic cycle, from evidence collection to administration of 
treatment, as a human would proceed (but not as software would proceed, because 
software does not take therapeutic actions). This model complements the analysis of 
distributed cognition explored earlier in the literature review, via an examination of how 
diagnostic software adds knowledge on which a doctor-software system can act. In 
addition, the three classic components of diagnosis (that is, computing, satisficing, and 
intuition) can fit within the Planned Behavior Model. In reference to Table 3, computing 
is a source of behavioral beliefs (element 1a of the model); intuition is a source of beliefs 
about beliefs (element 1c) and motivation (elements 4a and 4c), as is also the force that 
promotes belief in normativity (1b). Finally, computation, satisficing, and intuition work 
together to determine doctors’ attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual behavior. 
It is important to note that the relationship between the three classic elements of 
diagnosis (computation, satisficing, and intuition) and the Planned Behavior Model is a 
conceptual relationship. The relationship between the model and the elements of 
diagnosis has not been explored in the literature, and is better thought of as a means of 
interweaving behavioral theory with diagnostic science rather than as a precise 
description of what takes place during diagnostic decisions.  
It is possible to think of the diagnostic process as a search to reduce possibilities 
(Sox & Higgins, 1988) in the match between a set of symptoms and diseases that match 
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those symptoms. In this process, the role of computation is to eliminate as many 
inappropriate or poor matches as possible. The role of satisficing is to treat the possible 
disease matches and make empirical observations to test whether the diagnosis is 
working. The role of intuition is to bypass both computation and satisficing in those cases 
in which the physician makes what is essentially an educated, experience-based 
diagnostic guess. Diagnostic software can contribute in each of these domains of 
diagnosis. 
For example, if fed the input that a patient has elevated alpha fetoprotein, 
diagnostic software could either return a single suggestion based on statistical likelihoods 
of the fit between symptom and disease—for example, Patient has liver cancer—or else 
a list of all of the diseases with which an elevation of alpha fetoprotein is consistent, a list 
that can be sorted based on likelihood. The default setting on various medical software 
packages, including DiagnosisPro and Connectance, is to return a list of diseases with 
which a symptom is consistent, sometimes accompanied by a percentage quantification of 
the fit between symptom and disease (e.g., 5% of patients with hemothorax have atypical 
mycobacteria). Thus, the current medical software packages can engage in computation, 
satisficing, and a form of intuition (Newborn, 2003). Once again, however, it remains to 
be discovered in the qualitative portion of this study what doctors think of diagnostic 
software’s intuitive or pseudo-intuitive capabilities.    
The Role of Software Technology in Diagnoses 
Medical technology has existed from the beginning of the practice of medicine, 
given what is known about ancient human attempts at surgery (Cockburn, Cockburn, & 
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Reyman, 1998). In this study, however, only computer software will be discussed under 
the rubric of medical technology. It is appropriate, then, to delimit the discussion to 
computer software and to tie its development to medical decision-making. With that 
limitation in mind, the remainder of this final section of the literature review will dwell 
on recent research on diagnostic software. The purpose of this discussion is to gather as 
much knowledge as possible about what scholars think of the characteristics, strength, 
and weaknesses of diagnostic medical software. This discussion will be integrated with 
the earlier discussions of theory, and of the three frames—computation, satisficing, and 
intuition—of diagnostic decision-making.     
To begin with, diagnostic medical software can be divided into two broad 
categories. One kind of diagnostic software is embedded into diagnostic medical 
machines or databases; this kind of software does not make a diagnosis, per se, but rather 
provides information that is extremely important for the doctor in making a diagnosis 
(Eadie, Taylor, &Gibson, 2012). Another kind of software is specifically designed to be 
diagnostic in nature; fed data about a set of symptoms, it returns a diagnosis or list of 
diagnoses, accompanied by relevant information (Eadie et al., 2012). Both of these kinds 
of software will be discussed in turn. 
Many different kinds of diagnostic software accompany many different kinds of 
medical devices. One common and instructive example is that of software that 
accompanies a computerized tomography (CT) machine (De Palma, 2011). CT machines, 
which have a characteristic tube-like shape, are designed to take a three-dimensional 
image of human subjects. For example, CT scanning is often performed in order to 
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determine whether tumors, calcification, infarction, or other conditions are present in a 
patient (DePalma, 2011). A patient who comes to a doctor complaining of an 
unaccountable pain in the jaw might turn out to be suffering from a tumor that is pressing 
down on a nerve, and that might show up in a CT scan (DePalma, 2011).  
On its own, a CT scan conveys purely visual information. This information has to 
be interpreted (DePalma, 2011). A great deal of data is interpreted directly in the CT 
machine interface by diagnostic software that is part of the CT package (Fujiyoshi, 
Kadowaki, Kadowaki, Sekikawa, Ohkubo, & Miura, 2011). For example, the medical 
equipment company Siemens (2012) sells a workstation to accompany its CT unit, and 
one of the functions of the workstation is to be able to perform calcium analysis. For 
example, Siemens’ CT software can calculate what is known as a calcium score for the 
patient, on a vessel-by-vessel basis. Typically, if a patient were to have a CT scan for 
calcification, it would be the software itself—for example, Siemens’ Crealife CT 
Calcium Score Analysis Function—that would make the diagnosis of calcification, as in 
the case of hardened arteries (Baumuller, Leschka, Desbiolles, Stolzmann, Scheffel, & 
Seifert et al., 2009). Of course, that is not the only case in which calcification of the 
arteries could be diagnosed. A doctor could reach the same conclusion by means of a 
traditional differential diagnosis. The advantage of the CT software is that it can make a 
diagnosis whose accuracy cannot be replicated by a doctor. For example, in order to 
determine a calcium score for different blood vessels in a patient’s body, the doctor could 
theoretically probe into the vessels with a scalpel, take samples, and make manual 
calculations, but such a procedure would be unnecessary, invasive, and dangerous in 
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comparison with simply obtaining a calcium score from CT software (Watanabe, 
Nakazawa, Higashi, Itoh, & Naito, 2011). 
The use of computer-assisted diagnosis for radiology is well supported. 
According to Eadie et al., (2012), the significant error rate in radiology is between 2-
20%; in other words, radiologists working without the assistance of any form of 
diagnostic software tend to make clinically-significant errors anywhere from 2 to 20% of 
the time. Eadie et al.’s meta-review of 147 empirical studies on computer-assisted 
diagnosis within the field of radiology revealed that software assistance is associated with 
between half and a fourth of the rate of error as compared to unassisted human diagnosis. 
As Eadie et al. noted, however, a number of factors make it difficult to quantify the 
difference between the accuracy of unassisted human doctors and the accuracy of 
computer-assisted doctors; for example, computer-associated diagnostics vary 
significantly in purpose, design, and characteristics, so that making precise comparisons 
is methodologically difficult. Nonetheless, Eadie et al. suggested that, at worst, computer-
assisted diagnostic systems could improve a radiologist’s diagnostic accuracy by 25% 
and at best by 50%. As a result, computer-assisted diagnosis in the field of radiology has 
become nearly ubiquitous in the United States, and is spreading in many other countries 
(Eadie et al., 2012).  
Researchers in other areas of medicine have replicated results of the kind obtained 
in Eadie et al.’s (2012) study. Renz, Bottcher, Diekmann, Poellinger, Maurer, and Pfeil et 
al. (2012) discovered that computer-assisted diagnostic software embedded within a 
breast magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine was able to achieve diagnostic 
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accuracy of 93.5%, sensitivity of 96.5%, and specificity of 75.5%. The accuracy rate 
obtained by computer-assisted diagnosis in this case is between 10-20% greater than 
historic accuracy rates achieved without software (Renz et al., 2012).  
It is interesting to observe that, in studies in which doctors register their 
disapproval of diagnostic software, they fail to take CT and similar software into account. 
Doctors utilize diagnostic software on a routine basis because of the superior computing 
speed of such software. Indeed, much of the work that is done by this software is now an 
indispensable part of medicine; many tasks that doctors once did by hand, involving 
mental calculation and manual measurement, now take place in an electronic 
environment (Reece, 2009, p. 15). 
However, when doctors protest about diagnostic software, they are typically 
referring not to the kind of diagnostic software that is embedded in CT machines, but 
rather to software, that, fed a particular set of symptoms, returns a diagnosis. Such 
software is typically designed to run on a hand-held device that accompanies the doctor, 
although it can also run on personal computer workstations or laptops (Randeree, 2007). 
Differential diagnosis generation software is, in some ways, an extension of printed 
diagnostic manuals, which also serve as a reference guide to physicians trying to make a 
diagnosis. One of the differences between diagnostic manuals and diagnostic software is 
that doctors control the pace and quality of their interaction with manuals. In other words, 
a doctor is the one who makes the decision to consult a manual. On the other hand, 
diagnostic software is designed to accompany doctors into consultations with patients, 
which some doctors have found to be intrusive (O’Malley, Grossman, Cohen, Kemper, & 
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Pham, 2010). One of the classic complaints that doctors have about diagnostic software is 
that it represents some kind of curb on their autonomy; thus, it is not necessarily the mere 
fact of diagnostic software that some doctors have protested, but rather a pattern of 
administrative decisions that is seen as foisting particular tools and practices on doctors 
(Queenan, Angst, & Devaraj, 2011).  
Bond, Schwartz, Weaver, Levick, Giulianio, and Graber (2011) evaluated 
differential diagnosis generators with performance testing. The findings indicated that, in 
the field of differential diagnosis in particular, software is of varying strength; it is not yet 
the case that, as in the field of radiology, computer-assisted diagnosis has risen to the 
level of a must-have tool in differential diagnosis. Bond et al. (2011) discovered that only 
two differential diagnosis generators, Isabel ™ and DxPlain ™, performed well in 
testing. Ranked on a 5-point scale based on performance in achieving accurate diagnosis 
in 20 test cases, both Isabel ™ and DxPlain ™ were able to achieve a mean rating of 
3.45. There are thus two major differences between differential diagnosis generators and 
computer-assisted diagnosis in the fields of radiology and image analysis in general. 
First, differential diagnosis generators are less accurate than computer-assisted diagnosis 
in image analysis (Bond et al., 2011). Second, there is a wide variance in the performance 
level of commercially available differential diagnosis generators (Bond et al., 2011), 
which can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, it could be the case that image 
analysis is innately simpler than solving primary medicine cases. Second, image analysis 
is more advanced than differential diagnosis software. Since there do not appear to be 
empirical studies that compare the sophistication of differential diagnosis software with 
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computer-assisted diagnosis in image analysis, these questions have not been resolved; 
nonetheless, they ought to be kept in mind by future researchers interested in obtaining a 
more detailed understanding of the differences between the two major kinds of diagnostic 
software in the medical marketplace.   
There is clearly empirical support for the proposition that both differential 
diagnosis software and computer-assisted diagnostic software for image analysis work, 
although at differing levels of accuracy. There is also support (bolstered by Eadie et al.’s, 
2012 meta-review of 147 studies of computer-assisted image analysis in radiology) that 
radiologists and other doctors who analyze images work extensively with computer-
assisted diagnostic systems, especially in the United States. The main open question in 
the literature, and the one that is most germane to this study, is the question of how 
doctors engage with differential diagnostic software in real-world settings.  
Some empirical studies have added important insights to what is known about this 
topic. For example, Ramnarayan, Winrow, Coren, Nanduri, Buchdahl, and Jacobs et al. 
(2006) conducted a study of how pediatricians used differential diagnosis generators 
while on the job. Ramnarayan et al. (2006) discovered that, when given freedom of 
choice in resorting to the use of differential diagnosis generators in a pediatric hospital, 
physicians chose to access the system only 8.6% of the time, and to examine actual 
diagnostic advice only 2, 55% of the time. The mean usage time of the diagnostic system 
was only 1 minute, 38 seconds. Ramnarayan et al. reported that the main obstacle to 
diagnostic software use cited by the physicians in the study was technical; many 
physicians reported difficulty using the interface of the system, and some physicians 
48 
 
noted that they were working from locations in which access to the differential diagnosis 
system was difficult to obtain.   
Ramnarayan et al.’s (2006) study has a number of important implications for the 
topic of physician use of diagnostic software. To begin with, the study raises the 
possibility that, when use of differential diagnosis generators is not mandated, numerous 
physicians might simply be refusing diagnostic software because of issues of accessibility 
or perceived difficulty. The study provides support for the point made by Umscheid and 
Hanson (2011) and Bond et al. (2011) in different contexts, which is that differential 
diagnostic generation software has some quality gaps. Umscheid and Hanson 
summarized a number of non-technical and non-access-related reasons that physicians 
have historically given in order to justify the avoidance of diagnostic software. One such 
reason is that, in many medical contexts, the presenting cases are of what Umscheid and 
Hanson (2011) described as a “bread and butter” (p. 6) character. Another reason is that 
many doctors practice surgery and other practices that Umscheid and Hanson 
distinguished from so-called cognitive medicine. A third reason is that, when a presenting 
case is complex and a physician has a lack of knowledge, a more likely outcome than 
consulting a differential diagnosis generator is to consult a senior colleague or a 
colleague with more experience in treating the presenting set of symptoms. Based on 
these reasons, Umscheid and Hanson concluded that differential diagnosis software is 
useful in a number of contexts that might seldom manifest themselves in a doctor’s 
career. However, Umscheid and Hanson reached this conclusion based on a meta-review 
of only a few empirical studies, and other views about the nature of the relationship 
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between physicians and differential diagnosis generation software should be sought out 
and analyzed.  
While Umscheid and Hanson (2011) argued that differential diagnosis generators 
were not, overall, superior in accuracy or specificity to unaided physician diagnosis 
except in limited circumstances, a pseudo-experiment conducted by David, Chira, Eells, 
Ladrigan, Papier, and Miller et al. (2011) reached markedly different conclusions.  David 
et al. (2011) worked with a sample of patients whose cellulitis had been misdiagnosed by 
the admitting team. Interestingly, David et al. found that, in 64% of the cases, a 
differential diagnostic software package known as Visual Dx had included the correct 
diagnosis, which had been ignored or overridden by the physicians in the admitting team. 
David et al. discovered that unassisted physicians were only 14% accurate in diagnosing 
stasis dermatitis that presented with some of the characteristics of cellulitis. Thus, at least 
in their limited field of misdiagnosed cellulitis and based on what was after all a small 
sub-sample (N=28) of misdiagnosed patients, the differential diagnostic system studied 
by David et al. appeared to be 50% more accurate than an unassisted admitting team. 
Results of this kind indicate that differential diagnostic software might have its own 
pockets of excellence, especially in contrast to human diagnosticians; one strength of 
VisualDX, for example, was its integration with visual data (David et al., 2011). This 
result implies that differential diagnostic generators that are able to benefit from the more 
advanced forms of image analysis outshine generic differential diagnostic systems that 
rely on text and mote limited kinds of input. This implication is supported by the 
empirical literature, since there are many studies in which the accuracy and specificity of 
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differential diagnostic software embedded in image databases appears to be high (see for 
example the meta-review of studies in David et al., 2011’s literature review). There are 
fewer studies on the utility of differential diagnosis generators that are disconnected from 
visual data. 
Another empirical study confirming the superiority of visually based computer-
assisted diagnosis software over unassisted physicians was that of Puech, Betrouni, 
Makni, Dewalle, Villers, and Lemaitre (2009). Puech et al. (2009) discovered that a 
computer-assisted diagnostic tool was able to successfully diagnose 77% of instances of 
prostate cancer appearing in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) files, whereas expert 
radiologists examining the same MRI data only achieved a 70% rate of success. The 
findings of this sort indicate why, in radiology, diagnostic software is not an afterthought, 
but rather directly integrated into the ordinary diagnostic processes of radiologists.  
Of course, many physicians have also indicated their satisfaction with non-
visually-based diagnostic software, explaining that such software narrows down potential 
diagnoses, saves time by taking the place of a medical manual, and also serves as a 
convenient resource for patients, since diagnoses can be printed or emailed to patients 
from within the software interface (Chowdhury, Roy, & Saha, 2011, p. 221). Thus, the 
reaction to diagnostic software—at least in the United States—can best be described as 
mixed. Many doctors admire the computational robustness and convenience of diagnostic 
software, but resent such software’s potential to cut into the autonomy of their practices 
(Menachemi, Matthews, Ford, Hikmet, & Brooks, 2009). In terms of the Planned 
Behavior Model (Herath, 2010), doctors’ beliefs about their own decisions is thus a 
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determinant of how they feel about diagnostic software. Doctors who prize the autonomy 
of individual and independent beliefs and attitudes as a part of the diagnostic process 
might wish to distance themselves from software (Seeley, 2009). Older doctors might 
have a resistance to learning and re-learning new technology (Seeley, 2009). Other 
doctors take a different approach, seeing diagnostic software not as a form of competition 
but rather as an extension of the existing infrastructure of medical informatics (Shield, 
Goldman, Anthony, Wang, Doyle, & Borkan, 2010). Doctors who dislike learning new 
technology, who have physical difficulties with reading digital data, or who dislike 
having to install new software might also be at odds with using more software in their 
practices (Seeley, 2009). 
It should be emphasized that the purpose of diagnostic software is not, and has 
seldom been described as, an attempt to replace the doctor. The role of diagnostic 
software can be better understood through the concept of distributed cognition. 
According to Hazlehurst, Gorman, and McMullen (2008), distributed cognition is the act 
of cognition diffused across a system that is larger than the individual doctor is. For 
example, a doctor sitting and thinking about a diagnosis would be engaging in pure 
cognition, but a doctor consulting a reference manual or interacting with software would 
become part of what Hazlehurst et al. called a model of distributed cognition. The act of 
cognition cannot be said to reside in any one component of the system, but is distributed 
across it. In contemporary times, the spread of computer technology has brought 
distributed cognition to many fields; yet, as Hazlehurst et al. pointed out, distributed 
cognition has been around at least as long as humans have created machines and tools 
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(from the abacus to the personal computer) that can assist them in cognition. According 
to Hazlehurst et al. (2008), the goal of studying the diagnostic process as it manifests 
itself in software versus the doctor is not to argue on behalf of one or the other 
component of the system. Doctors and software will continue to work together as part of 
a system of distributed cognition that is deeply embedded in medicine. While accepting 
the reality of distributed cognition, however, it is still necessary to be able to better 
understand the division of labor between humans and software tools. Hsiung (2012) has 
pointed out that the pace of software adoption in American hospitals has been far slower 
than the adoption of other forms of medical technology. As Hsiung has stated, many 
doctors have been perfectly willing to take advantage of tools to assist them in arriving at 
their diagnostic decisions, but have resented the incursion of software that can take the 
input of a set of symptoms and return a diagnosis as an output. Whether this attitude is 
rational or not, it has been observed in many different medical contexts, leading to the 
conclusion that doctors take special pride in diagnosis and are wary of relinquishing their 
role to software. Thus, all of the forms of computational utility enabled by diagnostic 
software are best thought of parts of a distributed cognition system in which the key 
diagnostic role is still played by the doctor. 
The key problem acknowledged in the literature, especially literature pertaining to 
the American healthcare system, is the rate of misdiagnosis. Umscheid and Hanson 
(2011) pointed out that deaths from misdiagnosis in the United States have remained 
study somewhere between 40,000 and 80,000 a year, depending on the methodology by 
which such deaths are ascribed to misdiagnosis. There is no simple way in which to 
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illuminate the possible relationship between the unchanged rates of misdiagnosis in the 
United States and the use or non-use of diagnostic software. However, given that 
software of this kind has been available for over 30 years and was specifically designed 
in order to lower the rates of misdiagnosis, it is worth continuing to gather and analyze 
data on physicians’ usage of diagnostic software, and to understand what usage patterns 
might have to do with accurate diagnosis, misdiagnosis, and other medical outcomes.  
The empirical literature offers some insights into the relationship between 
diagnostic software and diagnostic outcomes. First, there is strong evidence that 
computer-assisted diagnostic systems that are tied into visual databases are both highly 
accurate and highly specific in their diagnoses. Eadie et al.’s (2012) meta-review of 147 
studies in the field of radiology found that such diagnostic software was nearly 
ubiquitous in the United States, and routinely achieved diagnostic accuracy rates over 
90%. Second, there is some research suggesting that physician adoption of differential 
diagnostic generation software—as opposed to diagnostic software embedded in 
machines or associated with image databases, as in radiology—is low, whether because 
of technical problems and perceived inconvenience (Ramnarayan et al., 2006) or whether 
because physicians seldom encounter a genuine need to use such software (Umscheid & 
Hanson, 2011). Nonetheless, there is other research (David et al., 2011) suggesting that 
differential diagnostic software can perform better than unassisted physicians in some 
fields, such as dermatology can.  
In general, the sheer number of symptom permutations, types of medicine, and 
differences between diagnostic software packages makes it difficult to reach conclusions 
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about the relationship between such software and diagnostic success. Nonetheless, there 
is compelling evidence that diagnostic software is, at best, superior to human diagnostic 
procedures and, at worst, able to function as a helpful adjunct to human diagnostic 
processes.     
                                              Summary and Conclusion 
In general, the literature is in agreement (Ahlers et al., 2010; Bath-Hextall et al., 
2011; Carpenito-Moyet, 2008; First & Tasman, 2011; Gifford, 2011) that diagnosis is a 
process characterized by the following steps: (a) Gathering of evidence, including 
physical evidence and verbal evidence (gathered from speaking to the patient) pertaining 
to a patient’s symptoms; (b) fitting knowledge about the symptoms to a specific disease, 
whether known or postulated; (c) determining the most appropriate treatment for the 
disease; and (d) fine-tuning the treatment based on ongoing observations of the 
interaction between the patient and the proposed treatment. However, there is some 
debate on the question of how culture- and value-laden the process of diagnosis is; with 
certain scholars (Byrne, 2012; Fadiman, 1988), having argued that diagnosis is heavily 
influenced by culture. On balance, however, there is stronger support in the literature for 
the idea that diagnosis is a repeatable, rigorous scientific process with the discrete steps 
enumerated above.  
Diagnosis was shown to have three components: Computation, satisficing, and 
intuition. The main computing concepts (Lefrancois, 2011; Nielsen, 2011) that apply in 
medicine are those of (a) engineering computing, in which the input and output can 
interact several times over the course of diagnosis; (b) the decision tree, in which the 
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utility of each possibility is calculated independently; and (c) confidence levels, in which 
relative rather than absolute recommendations are made based on statistical likelihoods 
that an observed symptom or set of symptoms corresponds with a disease. Computation 
can prevent certain cognitive fallacies, such as the representativeness heuristic, from 
manifesting themselves during the diagnostic process (Schwab, 2009) and serve as the 
basis for a self-correcting form of satisficing. Satisficing can be a comparison of several 
alternative solutions followed by a choice of the solution that seems more likely to 
succeed, or else an experimental means of working through possibilities (for example, six 
diagnoses of six different diseases that are all equally likely matches of an observed 
symptom set) in which the uniquely human characteristic of on-the-fly learning is 
important (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994). Finally, doctors often use intuition to shorten the 
decision process, make difficult diagnostic decisions, or raise the chances that patients 
will comply with a treatment implied by a specific diagnosis (Kattan & Cowen, 2009). 
Overall, the utility of software seems to be limited to computation; however, the literature 
review did not contain any studies that tried to quantify human advantages in satisficing 
and intuition versus the software advantage in computation.   
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction to Research Method 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to draw upon physician-provided data 
to determine why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has 
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. Knowledge that is 
more definitive is needed about why misdiagnosis has persisted well into the age of 
diagnostic software. The research method described and defended in this chapter was 
intended to generate such knowledge.  
 In addressing the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software 
has not coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis, a quantitative 
approach was necessary to determine which of some of the possible answers to this 
question—diagnostic software insufficiency, insufficient/improper use by physicians, or 
liability—is more popular with physicians and to determine whether answers to this 
question vary significantly depending on the demographic and professional 
characteristics of physicians, which also served as control variables in the study design in 
a manner described later in the chapter.  
Restatement of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions associated with the study were as follows: 
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?  
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than   
unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
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HA1: Diagnostic software use has less misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted 
human diagnostic methods. 
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
HA2: Physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive 
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
HA3: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software?   
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.  
HA4: Liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. 
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  Research Design and Approach 
According to Windelband (1913), nomothesis—the hallmark of quantitative 
research—is the search for laws and generalizations; nomothetic methods try to examine 
a research phenomena in the most general way possible. On the other hand, idiography is 
the study of unique phenomena. In Windelband’s example, an idiographic researcher 
might spend time and effort on trying to understand a single painting, whereas a 
nomothetic researcher might look for general differences between two classes of 
paintings.  
Diagnostic practices can, and indeed should, be studied from both nomothetic and 
idiographic perspectives because these two perspectives complement and enrich each 
other. In most qualitative methodologies, idiography requires rich narrative data (Lapan, 
Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2011) whereas nomothesis can be carried out with basic survey or 
numeric data (Mehl, Conner, & Csikzentmihalyi, 2011). In this study, nomothetic data 
were gathered using an original survey designed to answer the four research questions of 
the study.  
There are numerous quantitative designs available. Experimental, pre-
experimental, and quasi-experimental designs are all reliant on the experimenter’s control 
or partial control of variables (Creswell, 2009). In this study, I could not control or 
manipulate factors related to the use of diagnostic software, so these three approaches 
were not appropriate. A cross-sectional design is based on collecting data from 
participants at a single point at time; such designs can be used either to measure change 
in response to some manipulation of variables or else the prevalence of some attitude or 
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behavior in a test population (Creswell, 2009). A cross-sectional design was, therefore, an 
appropriate design for the study, given the focus on measuring physicians’ adoption of 
and attitudes to diagnostic software at a single point in time. 
Setting and Sample 
Conceptually—not physically, because the study was not reliant on direct 
observation or on-site analysis—the setting for this study was the world of medical 
diagnostics. According to Shealy (2011), diagnostic skill is taught and is required to be 
learned in all medical schools that offer an accredited degree in biomedicine; thus, it was 
assumed that all doctors in the sample were, in their own ways, experts in the process of 
diagnosis. The study qualification criteria for doctors were, simply, (a) being currently 
qualified and practicing as a doctor in the United States, (b) using English comfortably 
enough to participate in the survey, (c) having access to diagnostic software, and (d) 
giving consent. Given that the study is in English, it made the most sense to sample 
doctors from English-speaking countries. As the United States has by far the largest 
population of native English speakers in the world (Yoshihara, Sylva, & Eberstadt, 2011), 
and is home to most of the major diagnostic software providers currently in operation 
(Kramme, Hoffmanm, & Pozos, 2011), sampling from the United States was logical.  
In the United States, the AMA offers a master list of every U.S.-licensed 
physician; according to the AMA (2012), there were over 814,000 licensed physicians in 
the United States. I sent recruitment emails to 3,100 AMA-accredited physicians through 
their professional database licensees’ distribution list with the use of Survey Monkey 
platform that yielded a sample of 99 physicians for the study.  According to Kennett and 
60 
 
Salini (2011), the average response rate for a marketing campaign in which the target 
message recipient has some innate interest is between 2 and 3%. Assuming that this result 
is achieved, reaching out to 3,100 doctors (by a combination of e-mail, where available, 
and mass mailing) yielded a likelihood of 62 doctor respondents.  
A sample size over 60 is in line with the sample sizes reported by some previous 
scholars working with medical populations (Keeney et al., 2011) and should therefore be 
considered acceptable, even though it was not anticipated whether this sample size was 
sufficiently large or qualified enough to yield rich data for the study, or whether a sample 
over 60 was sufficient for all statistical procedures. The power analysis in Figure 1 
revealed that, with an effect size of 0.5 and an  of .05, a sample size over 45 is sufficient 
for a one sample t test (that is, a t test comparing a group mean versus a hypothesized 
value) at a power of 0.95. 
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Figure 1. Power analysis. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The first question asked was What kind of diagnostic software do you use? While 
none of the research questions pertained to what kind of diagnostic software did 
physicians use, it was still important to gather information on this point for descriptive 
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purposes. A brief definition and some examples of diagnostic software were provided as 
part of the survey. 
The first research question that guided the study were as follows: Does use of 
diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare versus unassisted human 
diagnostic methods?  
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted 
human diagnostic methods. Data for this question were collected by presenting the 
following two survey prompts:  
1. My use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
2. In general, physicians’ use of diagnostic software is likely to result in 
more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic 
methods.  
All of the survey questions differentiate between doctors’ own use of diagnostic software 
and their general perceptions about diagnostic software. Responses for all of the survey 
questions were conducted on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = completely disagree, 2 = 
disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 
= agree, and 7 = completely agree.  
 The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean 
survey response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis 
if the observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p 
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value was less than the alpha of 0.05.  Two one-tailed one-sample t tests were done, one 
for each survey prompt. 
 The second research question that guided the study were as follows: Do 
physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare?  
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. Data for this question were collected by presenting the 
sample the following two surveys prompts:  
1. I do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis 
in healthcare,  
2. In general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.    
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean survey 
response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis if the 
observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p-value 
was less than the alpha of 0.05.  Two one-tailed one-sample t tests were done, one for 
each survey prompt. 
The third research question that guided the study were as follows: Is physicians’ 
knowledge of diagnostic software extensive enough to decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare?  
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H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. Data for this question were collected by presenting 
the following two survey prompts:  
1. My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare.   
2. In general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive 
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.  
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean survey 
response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis if the 
observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p-value 
was less than the alpha of 0.05.  Two one-tailed one-sample t tests were done, one for 
each survey prompt. 
The fourth research question that guided the study were as follows: Do liability 
concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software?   
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. 
Data for this question were collected by presenting the following two questions: 
1. Liability concerns do not prevent me from using diagnostic software.  
2. In general, liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic 
software.   
The operationalization of the null hypothesis was Ho: The value of the mean survey 
response was greater than or equal to 4. I would have rejected the null hypothesis if the 
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observed mean response to the survey question were sufficiently small so that the p-value 
was less than the alpha of 0.05.   
Hypothesis testing for the research questions were carried out with the assistance 
of standard statistical software (i.e., SPSS™). According to Dewberry (2004), Likert 
scales are continuous: “a common way of obtaining continuous data in organizational 
research is with a Likert scale” (p. 9). A t test was, therefore, appropriate to use with a 
Likert scale.  
No instruments other than the Likert-type scales discussed above were used in the 
study. Not using an instrument allowed doctors to define the concepts of expertise, 
frequency of use, liability, and the capability of diagnostic software in their own personal 
and professional contexts instead of requiring them to align their responses with others’ 
operationalizations of these concepts. Additionally, since physicians are among the 
busiest of all professionals, it was unlikely that they would submit to the administration 
of several scales; it was therefore a research advantage to design an instrument that could 
be answered in only a few minutes.    
Instrumentation and Materials 
The instrument for data collection was an online survey, hosted on the Survey 
Monkey™ platform that presented the following prompts, in addition to demographic 
questions about the doctor’s age, practice area, and gender:  
1. What kind of diagnostic software do you use?  
2. My use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
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3. In general, physicians’ use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more 
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
4.  I do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare.  
5. In general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.  
6. My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare.  
7. In general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough 
to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.  
8.  Liability concerns do not prevent me from using diagnostic software. 
9. In general, liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic 
software.  
Because this was a new questionnaire, a reliability analysis was conducted on the 
first 15 to 20 responses.  Cronbach’s alpha was used to determine whether the survey 
instrument had sufficient reliability.  Changes were made to the survey items based upon 
the results of this analysis. The proposed sampling strategy to select 3,100 doctors 
randomly from the master list of American Medical Association yielded a likelihood of 
62 doctor respondents. This was theoretical and increased validity. Physicians who 
completed the survey may have different characteristics such as, different areas of 
practice and specializations. It is likely, therefore, that the results were not highly 
generalizable to the entire population of American doctors. 
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Protection of Human Participants 
The four commonly-accepted (Creswell, 2009) categories of ethical assurances in 
research are offering protection from harm, using informed consent, defending the 
privacy of study subjects, and being honest with professional colleagues and study 
subjects. This study posed no innate harms to subjects and will use best practices 
(Creswell, 2009) for informed consent. IRB approval (# 07-16-13-0036160) was obtained 
prior to the collection of any data. Respondent privacy was defended in the following 
ways: First, the surveys did not collect respondents’ names or other data that could be 
used by outside parties to identify respondents; second, all electronic forms were 
encrypted; third, all electronic forms received by the researcher from Survey Monkey™ 
were placed on a password-protected laptop to which only the researcher had access, and 
were furthermore backed up by online storage at Box.com ™ in case of laptop theft or 
loss; finally, all data will be destroyed no earlier than seven years after the study has been 
accepted by the researcher’s institution. Honesty with professional colleagues and study 
subjects were ensured by means of following the ethical precepts of research, and by 
means of publishing the raw data of the study for open scrutiny at the end of the study.      
Conclusion 
 The quantitative approach described and defended in this chapter was designed to 
address the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software has not 
coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis. The quantitative approach 
determined which of the possible answers to this question—diagnostic software 
insufficiency, insufficient / improper use by physicians, or liability—was more plausible 
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to physicians, in a manner that casted more light on why the problem of misdiagnosis has 
persisted despite the proliferation of technology. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction to Results 
The purpose of this study is to draw upon physician-provided data to determine 
why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has remained high 
despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. This chapter contains three 
sections for reporting and interpreting the results of the study. The first section is an 
overview of descriptive statistics. The second section consists of the inferential statistics 
associated with the research hypotheses. The third section consists of findings that are not 
related to the research questions but that still cast light on the question of physicians’ 
relationships with diagnostic software.  
The research questions of the study were as follows: 
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software use decrease misdiagnosis 
in healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?  
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive 
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software?   
I collected data from July 8, 2013 to October 16, 2013. There were 99 surveys 
distributed, of which 97 were completed, indicating a completion rate of roughly 98%. 
One of the 97 respondents did not answer the questions pertaining to Hypotheses 5 to 8. 
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Recruitment emails were sent to 3,100 physicians; the response rate was roughly 3%, 
close to the rate anticipated in Chapter 3. There was a deviation from the data collection 
plan presented in Chapter 3. The sample of 99 was likely to be representative of the 
physician population of 814,000, given that the a priori sample size analysis in Figure 1 
suggested a sample of 45 in order to achieve a confidence interval of 95% in the context 
of the chosen statistical procedure and effect size.  The Cronbach’s Alpha of the survey 
was .761, indicating a high level of internal consistency. 
                                    Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables 
The specialty areas of physician’s bar chart in Figure 2 indicated that there were 97 
respondents in the sample from a wide variety of specialization areas of medicine. 
 
 
Figure 2. Specialty areas of physicians in sample. 
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According to data collected on specialty areas of physicians in the sample 
presented in Figure 2, the most well-represented categories of medicine in the survey 
were family medicine (22 out of 97 respondents), internal medicine (17 out of 97 
respondents), and OB/GYN (14 out of 97 respondents).  
 Further analysis of descriptive statistics revealed that the majority of the sample 
(59.8%) had practiced medicine between 0 and 10 years (Table 4), that the sample was 
geographically well-distributed (Table 5), the sample tended to be fairly young (Table 6), 
and that men and women were equal in number (Table 7).  
Table 4 
Experience of Physicians in Sample 
 Frequency Percent 
 
Less than 5 years 36 37.1 
5-10 years 22 22.7 
11-20 years 18 18.6 
21-30 years 11 11.3 
More than 30 
years 
9 9.3 
Total 96 99.0 
Missing  1 1.0 
______________________ 
Total 
_________ 
97 
________ 
100.0 
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Table 5 
Geographic Location of Physicians in Sample 
 Frequency Percent 
 
New England  17 17.5 
Mid-Atlantic  16 16.5 
South Atlantic  18 18.6 
South  11 11.3 
Midwest  9 9.3 
Mountain  9 9.3 
Pacific  16 16.5 
Total 96 99.0 
Missing System 1 1.0 
______ ___________________ _________ ________ 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 6 
Age of Physicians in Sample 
 Frequency Percent 
 
Less than 30 years 
old 
23 23.7 
30-40 years old 26 26.8 
41-50 years old 20 20.6 
51-60 years old 16 16.5 
61-65 years old 7 7.2 
More than 65 years _ ________5 _____5.2 
   
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 7 
Gender of Physicians in Sample 
 Frequency Percent 
 
Male 51 52.6 
Female 46 47.4 
Total 97 100.0 
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Descriptive statistics pertaining to participants’ usage of diagnostic software were 
also collected and are shown in Tables 8 to 14. I presented the results of the data 
collected on use and non use of different diagnostic software packages among the 
sampled physicians in Tables 8 to 14. 
Table 8 
 Access to Various Diagnostic 
Medical Packages 
Frequency Percent 
 
None 42 43.3 
Isabel 17 17.5 
DXplain 7 7.2 
Your rapid diagnosis 8 8.2 
Diagnosis pro 6 6.2 
Connectance 9 9.3 
Search engines 1 1.0 
Use more than 1 
software___  
________7 _____7.2 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 9 
 Diagnostic Medical Packages 
Used 
Frequency Percent 
 
None 42 43.3 
Isabel 17 17.5 
DXplain 7 7.2 
Your rapid diagnosis 8 8.2 
Diagnosis pro 6 6.2 
Connectance 9 9.3 
Search engines 1 1.0 
Use more than 1 
software___  
_________7 ______7.2 
Total 97 100.0 
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Table 10 
 Length of Access to 
Diagnostic Software 
Frequency Percent 
 
Not applicable 42 43.3 
Less than 6 months 8 8.2 
6 months to 1 year 10 10.3 
1-3 years 14 14.4 
3-5 years 17 17.5 
Use more than 5 
years_ 
_________6 ______6.2 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 11 
 Length of Using 
Diagnostic Software 
Frequency Percent 
 
Not applicable 42 43.3 
Less than 6 months 8 8.2 
6 months to 1 year 12 12.4 
1-3 years 12 12.4 
3-5 years 17 17.5 
Use more than 5 
years_ 
________6 _____6.2 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 12 
 Access to Types of Diagnostic 
Software 
Frequency Percent 
 
None 42 43.3 
Isabel 11 11.3 
DXplain 8 8.2 
Your rapid diagnosis 6 6.2 
Diagnosis pro 5 5.2 
Connectance 8 8.2 
Search engines 5 5.2 
EasyDiagnosis 2 2.1 
NxOpinion 1 1.0 
Use more than 1 
software__  
________9 _____9.3 
Total 97 100.0 
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Table 13 
 Diagnostic Software Currently Used 
 Frequency Percent 
 
None 42 43.3 
Isabel 11 11.3 
DXplain 8 8.2 
Your rapid diagnosis 6 6.2 
Diagnosis pro 5 5.2 
Connectance 8 8.2 
Search engines 5 5.2 
EasyDiagnosis 2 2.1 
NxOpinion 1 1.0 
Use more than 1 
software___  
________9 _____9.3 
Total 97 100.0 
 
Table 14 
 Length of Time Using Current Software 
 
 Frequency Percent 
 
Not applicable 47 48.5 
Less than 6 months 7 7.2 
6 months to 1 year 14 14.4 
1-3 years 9 9.3 
3-5 years 14 14.4 
Use more than 5 
years_ 
________6 _____6.2 
Total 97 100.0 
 
One of the important insights that emerged from Tables 8 to 14 was that slightly 
over 43% of the sample reported not using, and not having ever used, diagnostic 
software. In the Other Findings section of this chapter, some of the differences between 
diagnostic software adopters and non adopters were explored in greater depth. In the next 
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section of the chapter, inferential statistics were calculated in order to perform the 
hypothesis tests to provide information for answering the research questions of the study.  
Inferential Statistics 
Responses for all of the survey questions followed a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = 
completely disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = completely agree.  
  The research questions and hypotheses of the study were as follows: 
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods?  
H01: Diagnostic software use has more misdiagnoses in healthcare than   
unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
HA1: Diagnostic software use has less misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted 
human diagnostic methods.  
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
H02: Physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
HA2: Physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive 
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
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H03: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
HA3: Physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software?   
H04: Liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic software.  
HA4: Liability concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. 
One-sample t tests were carried out on each of the null hypotheses. Before the t 
tests, descriptive statistics were collected for each of the survey questions. These 
descriptive statistics included four measurements: (a) N (the number of respondents who 
answered the prompt), (b) mean (the mean response score, on a Likert scale of 1-7), (c) 
standard deviation, and (d) standard error of the mean. These descriptive statistics, as 
well as the inferential statistic of the 95% confidence interval, are presented in Table 15 
and Table 16. Note that one of the 97 respondents did not respond to any of the Table 16 
questions, and that another respondent did not respond to the question for H7. 
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Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (Personal Use) 
H Survey Questions N Mean SD SE 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Mean 
      Lower Upper 
H1 My use of diagnostic software is 
likely to result in more 
misdiagnoses in healthcare than 
unassisted human diagnostic 
methods. 
55 2.47 2.01 0.27 
 
 
1.92 
 
 
3.01 
 
H2 
 
I do not use diagnostic software 
frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnoses in healthcare. 
 
55 3.24 1.93 0.26 
 
 
2.71 
 
 
3.75 
 
H3 
 
My knowledge of diagnostic 
software is not extensive enough 
to result in a decrease in 
misdiagnoses. 
55 3.60 2.06 0.28 
 
 
3.04 
 
 
4.15 
 
H4 
 
Liability concerns do not prevent 
me from using diagnostic 
software. 
 
55 5.31 1.99 0.27 
 
 
4.77 
 
 
 
5.84 
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Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics of the collected Sample (Physicians in General) 
H Survey Questions N Mean SD SE 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Mean 
      Lower Upper 
 
H5 
 
In general, physicians’ use of 
diagnostic software is likely to 
result in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human 
diagnostic methods. 
 
96 3.89  2.09 0.21 
 
 
 
3.46 
 
 
 
4.30 
 
H6 
  
In general, physicians do not use 
diagnostic software frequently 
enough to decrease misdiagnoses 
in healthcare. 
96 3.74 1.90 0.19 
 
 
3.35 
 
 
4.13 
 
H7 
 
In general, physicians’ knowledge 
of diagnostic software is not 
extensive enough to result in a 
decrease in misdiagnoses. 
95 3.99 1.92 0.20 
 
 
3.60 
 
 
4.38 
 
H8 
 
In general, liability concerns do 
not prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software. 
 
96 5.22 1.64 0.17 
 
 
4.88 
 
 
5.55 
 
After the descriptive statistics were collected, an attempt was made to measure 
whether there was a significant difference between the mean of the response and the 
value of 4; 4 was chosen as the cutoff value because it was the mean value between 1 and 
7 on the Likert scale. The p values are presented in Table 17.  
 
Table 17 
One-Sample T Test Results 
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Survey question      t  p (two- 
tailed) 
p (one-
tailed) 
Effect 
Size 
 
H1     My use of diagnostic software is 
          likely to result in more misdiagnoses 
          in healthcare than unassisted human 
          diagnostic methods. 
 
-5.641 
  
<.001 
 
<.001 
 
.76 
 
H2     I do not use diagnostic software 
          frequently enough to decrease 
          misdiagnoses in healthcare. 
 
-2.929 
  
.005 
 
.0025 
 
.40 
 
H3    My knowledge of diagnostic 
         Software is not extensive enough  
         to result in a decrease in 
         misdiagnoses. 
 
-1.440 
  
.156 
 
.078 
 
.29 
 
H4    Liability concerns do not prevent me 
         from using diagnostic software. 
 
 
4.880 
  
<.001 
 
>.999 
 
.66 
H5    In general, physicians’ use of 
         diagnostic software is likely to result 
         in more misdiagnoses in healthcare 
         than unassisted human diagnostic 
         methods. 
 
-.514  .183 .0915 .05 
H6    In general, physicians do not use 
         diagnostic software frequently  
         enough to decrease misdiagnoses in 
         healthcare. 
-1.340  .593 .2965 .13 
 
H7    In general, physicians’ knowledge of 
         diagnostic software is not extensive 
         enough to result in a decrease in  
         misdiagnoses. 
 
  -.053 
  
.958 
 
.479 
 
.005 
 
H8    In general, liability concerns do not 
         prevent physicians from using 
         diagnostic software.  
 
 
  7.297 
  
<.001 
 
>.999 
 
.74 
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Since a one-tailed approach was used, the directionality of the one-sample t-tests 
was ≥ 4 for each of the hypotheses. With this point in mind, the results of the one-sample 
t-tests were as follows. 
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H1, whether doctors’ personal use 
of diagnostic software was likely to result in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than 
unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null hypothesis was that personal diagnostic 
software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human 
diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this 
prompt (M = 2.47, SD = 2.008) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -5.641, p < .001, 
so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore found for the alternative 
hypothesis, which was the claim that personal diagnostic software use resulted in fewer 
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Table 18 and 
Table 19 contain the test results for each of the eight survey prompts: 
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Table 18 
Hypothesis Testing Results (Personal Use) 
Null hypothesis p(one 
tailed) 
   Result  
      
H1     My use of diagnostic software  
          diagnostic software is likely to result 
          in more misdiagnoses in healthcare 
          than unassisted human diagnostic 
          methods. 
 
<.001    Rejected  
H2     I do not use diagnostic software 
          frequently enough to decrease 
          misdiagnoses in healthcare. 
.0025    Rejected  
 
H3    My knowledge of diagnostic software  
          is not extensive enough to result in a 
          decrease in misdiagnoses. 
 
.078 
    
Retained 
 
 
 H4    Liability concerns do not 
          prevent physicians from using 
          diagnostic software.  
 
 
>.999 
    
Retained 
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Table 19 
Hypothesis Testing Results (Physicians in General Use) 
Null hypothesis p(one 
tailed) 
   Result  
      
H5     In general, physicians’ use of 
          diagnostic software is likely to result 
          in more misdiagnoses in healthcare 
          than unassisted human diagnostic 
          methods. 
 
.0915    Retained  
H6     In general, physicians do not use 
          diagnostic software frequently  
          enough to decrease misdiagnoses in 
          healthcare. 
.2965    Retained  
 
H7     In general, physicians’ knowledge of 
          diagnostic software is not extensive 
          enough to result in a decrease in  
          misdiagnoses. 
 
.479 
    
Retained 
 
 
 H8    In general, liability concerns do not 
          prevent physicians from using 
          diagnostic software.  
 
 
>.999 
    
Retained 
 
 
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H2, whether doctors thought that 
they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare. 
The null hypothesis was that physicians thought they did not use diagnostic software 
frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The results indicated that 
doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.24, SD = 1.934) was 
significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -2.929, p = .0025, so the null hypothesis was rejected.  
Some support was therefore found for the alternative hypothesis, which was that 
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physicians thought they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H3, whether doctors thought that 
their knowledge of diagnosis software was extensive enough to result in a decrease in 
misdiagnoses. The null hypothesis was that doctors would agree with this prompt. The 
results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.60, SD = 
2.060) was not significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -1.440, p = .078, I have not found 
evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.   
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H4, whether doctors thought that 
liability concerns did not prevent them from using diagnostic software. The null 
hypothesis was that liability concerns did not prevent physicians from using diagnostic 
software. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M 
= 5.31, SD = 1.990) was significantly higher than 4, t(96) = 4.880, p = 1.000, I have not 
found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.   
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H5, whether doctors thought that, 
in general, physician use of diagnostic software was likely to result in more misdiagnoses 
in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null hypothesis was that, in 
general, diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than 
unassisted human diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of 
agreement with this prompt (M = 3.89, SD = 2.092) was not significantly lower than 4, 
t(96) = -.514, p = .0915, I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null 
hypothesis was retained. 
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 A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H6, whether doctors thought that, 
in general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnoses in healthcare. The null hypothesis was that in general, physicians did not 
use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The 
results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.74, SD = 
1.904) was not significantly lower than 4, t(96) = -.1.340, p = .2965, I have not found 
evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained. 
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H7, whether doctors thought that, 
in general, physician knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to result 
in a decrease in misdiagnosis. The null hypothesis was that in general, physicians’ 
knowledge of diagnostic software was not extensive enough to decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt 
(M = 3.99, SD = 1.921) was not significantly lower than 4, t(95) = -.053, p = .479, I have 
not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained. 
A one-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate H8, whether doctors thought that, 
in general, liability concerns prevented physicians from using diagnostic software.  The 
null hypothesis was that in general, liability concerns did not prevent physicians from 
using diagnostic software. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement 
with this prompt (M = 5.22, SD = 1.636) was not significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 
7.297, p = 1.000, I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis 
was retained. 
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Physicians thus indicated that they thought their personal use of diagnostic 
software to be associated with error reduction, and in particular that their personal use of 
diagnostic software was frequent enough for the purpose of error reduction. Interestingly, 
doctors did not agree with the proposition that their knowledge of diagnostic software 
was extensive enough for misdiagnosis reduction purposes. Additionally, doctors were 
not personally deterred from using diagnostic software by liability concerns. When asked 
to speak for their profession, physicians did not agree with the claims that (a) diagnostic 
software use is associated with diagnostic error reduction, (b) diagnostic software is used 
frequently enough to make a difference, (c) physician knowledge of diagnostic software 
is extensive, and (d) physicians are deterred by liability concerns. As a result, I retained 
the null hypothesis. 
Interestingly, the results of hypothesis testing for the fifth through the eight null 
hypotheses were the same when the one-sample t tests were run separately for those 
physicians who had never used diagnostic software and those physicians who had used 
diagnostic software.  Additionally, all eight hypothesis tests were run again on separate 
sub-samples. First, the sample was divided into men and women. Second, the sample was 
divided into two groups of physicians, namely (a) those in family medicine, OB/GYN, 
and internal medicine; and (b) those in every other specialty area. Third, the sample was 
divided into physicians who were 40 or younger versus physicians who were over 40. 
The results of hypothesis testing did not differ significantly on these subgroups; in no 
case did a p value that was below .05 in Tables 18 and 19 change to .05 or over, and in no 
case did a p value that was .05 or over in Tables 18 and 19 fall under 05. There is 
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therefore some support for the claim that the findings of the study hold across gender, 
specialty area, and physician age.     
The implications of these findings relevant to the literature will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. Before proceeding to the discussion of findings, I will present 
information about some of the assumptions of the one-sample t tests and procedures 
related to non-parametric techniques.  
     Other Findings 
According to Sheskin (2003), there are a number of assumptions that must be met 
by the one-sample t test. One assumption is that the sample has been randomly drawn. In 
this study, a randomly selected sub-population of 3,100 AMA-accredited physicians 
through Survey Monkey yielded a sample of 99 physicians using the techniques 
described in Chapter 3, so the assumption of randomness was met. The independence 
assumption of the one-sample t test is that observations are independent. In this study, 
each physician recorded one answer to every question independently from the other 
participants, so the observations are independent from each other. Another assumption is 
the use of interval or ratio data. Likert data is often treated as being interval data 
(Sheskin, 2003), since the range of Likert scale in this study is 7 and the test statistic 
comes from the sum of all of the responses from the respondents, so this assumption was 
also met. A final statistical assumption of the one-sample t test is that the data pass a test 
of normality such as the Shapiro-Wilk W test or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. If 
normality is not observed, then a non-parametric option to the one-sample t test, such as 
the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, can be used. I ran tests of normality on each 
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of the eight survey prompts associated with the hypotheses of the study as seen in Table 
20.  
Table 20 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
H1  My use of diagnostic 
      software is likely to 
       result in more 
       misdiagnoses in 
       healthcare than  
       unassisted human 
       diagnostic methods. 
.339 55 .000 .716 55 .000 
 
H2  I do not use 
      diagnostic software  
      frequently enough to  
      decrease misdiagnoses 
      in healthcare. 
.248 55 .000 .858 55 .000 
 
H3 My knowledge of 
      diagnostic software  
      is not extensive 
      enough to result in a  
      decrease in  
      misdiagnoses. 
 
.236 55 .000 .850 55 .000 
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Table 20 
 
H4  Liability concerns do 
       not prevent me from 
       using diagnostic  
       software. 
.327 55 .000 .795 55 .000 
H5  In general, physicians 
       do not use diagnostic 
       software frequently 
       enough to decrease 
       misdiagnoses in 
       healthcare. 
 
.182 55 .000 .887 55 .000 
H6 In general, physicians’ 
      use of diagnostic 
      software is likely to 
      result in more 
      misdiagnoses in 
      healthcare than 
      unassisted human 
      diagnostic methods. 
 
.216 55 .000 .884 55 .000 
H7 In general, physicians’ 
      knowledge of 
      diagnostic software is 
      not extensive enough 
      to result in a decrease 
      in misdiagnoses. 
 
.199 55 .000 .912 55 .001 
H8 In general, liability 
      concerns do not 
      prevent physicians 
      from using diagnostic 
      software? 
.273 55 .000 .808 55 .000 
Note. a. Lilliefors Significance Correction                                    
                                                                                     table continues 
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Because the Shapiro-Wilk W and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality 
both disclosed that the data for the eight prompts tested in the study were not distributed 
normally, the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was also conducted on the data. In 
conducting the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, the null hypothesis in each instance was that 
the median response ≥ 4. Because the interval data range for the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test are the same as for the one-sample t test, no further assumption testing was 
conducted. Since a one-tailed approach was used, the directionality of the one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was ≥ 4 for each of the hypotheses.  
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H1, whether 
doctors’ personal use of diagnostic software was likely to result in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null hypothesis was that 
personal diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than 
unassisted human diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of 
agreement with this prompt (M = 2.47, SD = 2.008) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) 
= 138.0, p < 0.001, so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was therefore 
found for the alternative hypothesis, which was the claim that personal diagnostic 
software use resulted in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human 
diagnostic methods.  
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H2, whether 
doctors thought that they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnoses in healthcare. The null hypothesis was that physicians thought they did not 
use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The 
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results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.24, SD = 
1.934) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 273.0, p < 0.001, so the null hypothesis was 
rejected.  Some support was therefore found for the alternative hypothesis, which was 
that physicians thought they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H3, whether 
doctors thought that their knowledge of diagnosis software was extensive enough to 
result in a decrease in misdiagnoses. The null hypothesis was that doctors would agree 
with this prompt. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this 
prompt (M = 3.60, SD = 2.060) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 389.0, p < 0.001, 
so the null hypothesis was rejected.  Some support was therefore found for the alternative 
hypothesis that doctors thought that their knowledge of diagnosis software was extensive 
enough to result in a decrease in misdiagnoses.   
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H4, whether 
doctors thought that liability concerns prevent them from using diagnostic software. The 
null hypothesis was that liability concerns did not prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement with this 
prompt (M = 5.31, SD = 1.990) was significantly higher than 4, t(96) = 1081.0, p = 0.99, 
I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypothesis was retained.   
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H5, whether 
doctors thought that, in general, physician use of diagnostic software was likely to result 
in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The null 
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hypothesis was that, in general, diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. The results indicated that doctors’ 
mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 3.89, SD = 2.092) was significantly lower 
than 4, t(96) = 1337.5, p <0 .001, so the null hypothesis was rejected. Some support was 
therefore found for the alternative hypothesis, which was the claim that general 
diagnostic software use resulted in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted 
human diagnostic methods.  
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H6, whether 
doctors thought that, in general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently 
enough to decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare. The null hypothesis was that in general, 
physicians thought they did not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of agreement 
with this prompt (M = 3.74, SD = 1.904) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) = 1557.5, p 
= 0.001, so the null hypothesis was rejected.  Some support was therefore found for the 
alternative hypothesis, which was that physicians, in general, thought they used 
diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H7, whether 
doctors thought that, in general, physician knowledge of diagnostic software is not 
extensive enough to result in a decrease in misdiagnosis. The null hypothesis was that in 
general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software was not extensive enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The results indicated that doctors’ mean level of 
agreement with this prompt (M = 3.99, SD = 1.921) was significantly lower than 4, t(96) 
93 
 
= 1642.5, p = 0.008, so the null hypothesis was rejected.  Some support was therefore 
found for the alternative hypothesis that doctors thought that their knowledge of 
diagnosis software was extensive enough to result in a decrease in misdiagnoses.   
A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to evaluate H8, whether 
doctors thought that, in general, liability concerns prevented physicians from using 
diagnostic software.  The null hypothesis was that in general, liability concerns did not 
prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. The results indicated that doctors’ 
mean level of agreement with this prompt (M = 5.22, SD = 1.636) was not significantly 
lower than 4, t(96) = 3458.5, p < 0.099, I have not found evidence to reject this statement, 
so the null hypothesis was retained.
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Table 21 
Hypothesis Testing Based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Personal Use) 
Null Hypothesis Wilcoxon 
Test 
Statistic 
p (two- 
tailed) 
p (one- 
tailed) 
Result   
H1     My use of diagnostic 
          software is likely to 
          result in more  
          misdiagnoses in 
          healthcare than 
          unassisted human 
          diagnostic method 
 
H2     I do not use diagnostic 
          software frequently 
          enough to decrease 
          misdiagnoses in 
          healthcare. 
 
H3     My knowledge of 
          Diagnostic Software is 
          not extensive enough  
          to result in a decrease  
          in misdiagnoses. 
 
H4     Liability concerns do 
          not prevent me from 
          using diagnostic software. 
 
 
 
138.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273.0 
 
 
 
 
 
389.0 
 
 
 
 
 
1081.0 
 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
   
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
<0.001 
 
 
 
 
   
0.99 
 
Rejected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rejected 
 
 
 
 
 
Rejected 
 
 
 
 
 
Retained 
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Table 22 
Hypothesis Testing Based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (Physicians in General) 
Null Hypothesis Wilcoxon 
Test 
Statistic 
p  (two-
tailed) 
p (one-
tailed) 
Result   
H5     In general, physicians’ use 
          Of diagnostic software is 
          likely to result in more 
          misdiagnoses in healthcare 
          than unassisted human 
          diagnostic methods. 
 
 
1337.5 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
Rejected 
  
H6     In general, physicians do 
          not use diagnostic software 
          frequently enough to 
          decrease misdiagnoses  
          in healthcare. 
 
1557.5 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
Rejected 
  
 
H7     In general, physicians’ 
          knowledge of diagnostic 
          software is not extensive 
          enough to result in a  
          decrease in misdiagnoses. 
 
 
1642.5 
 
 
0.020 
 
 
0.008 
 
 
Rejected 
  
 
H8     In general, liability  
          concerns do not 
          prevent physicians from 
          using diagnostic software.  
 
 
 
3458.5 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
<0.099 
 
 
Retained 
  
 
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H1 and H5, 
whether doctors use of diagnostic software were likely to result in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Speaking for themselves and the 
profession, the results indicated that doctors’ mean levels of agreement with these 
prompts were significantly lower than 4, so the null hypotheses were rejected. Some 
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support were therefore found for the alternative hypotheses, which were the claims that 
diagnostic software use resulted in fewer misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted 
human diagnostic methods.  
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H2 and H6, 
whether doctors thought that they used diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease 
misdiagnoses in healthcare.  Speaking for themselves and the profession, the results 
indicated that doctors’ mean levels of agreement with these prompts were significantly 
lower than 4, so the null hypotheses were rejected. Some support were therefore found 
for the alternative hypotheses, which were the claims that physicians thought they used 
diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare. 
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H3 and H7, 
whether doctors thought that their knowledge of diagnostic software are not extensive 
enough to result in decrease in misdiagnoses. Speaking for themselves and the profession, 
the results indicated that doctors’ mean levels of agreement with these prompts were 
significantly lower than 4, so the null hypotheses were rejected. Some supports were 
therefore found for the alternative hypotheses, which were the claims that physicians 
knowledge of diagnostic software are not extensive enough to result in a decrease in 
misdiagnoses. 
One-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to evaluate H4 and H8, 
whether doctors thought that liability concerns did not prevent them from using 
diagnostic software. Speaking for themselves and the profession, the results indicated that 
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doctors’ mean levels of agreement with this prompt were significantly higher than 4, I 
have not found evidence to reject this statement, so the null hypotheses were retained.   
Summary 
The answers to the research questions of the study were as follows: 
Research Question 1: Does use of diagnostic software decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare versus unassisted human diagnostic methods? Speaking for themselves, 
physicians did not agree with the null hypothesis that personal diagnostic software use 
resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. 
Therefore, I can conclude that the physicians believe that personal diagnostic software 
results in fewer misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Speaking for 
the profession, I would say that there is insufficient evidence to refute the null hypothesis 
that general diagnostic software use resulted in more misdiagnoses in healthcare than 
unassisted human diagnostic methods.  
Research Question 2: Do physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare? Speaking for themselves, but not for the profession 
in general, physicians did not agree with the null hypothesis that they did not use 
diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. Therefore, 
I can conclude that the physicians believe frequent use that personal diagnostic software 
results in fewer misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Speaking for 
the profession in general, I would conclude that there is insufficient evidence to refute the 
null hypothesis that physicians did not use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare.  
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Research Question 3: Is physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software extensive 
enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare? Speaking for themselves and the 
profession, I would say that there is insufficient evidence to refute the null hypothesis 
that physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software was not extensive enough to decrease 
misdiagnosis in healthcare.  
Research Question 4: Do liability concerns prevent physicians from using 
diagnostic software?  Speaking for both themselves and the profession, there is 
statistically significant evidence that the doctors in the sample have a different opinion 
than “neither agree or disagree”. Majority of the physicians in this sample thought that 
liability concerns were not preventing physicians from using diagnostic software.   
Having arrived at these results, the focus of the fifth and concluding chapter of the 
study will be on relating these findings to previous empirical findings and theoretical 
models, acknowledging limitations, and providing recommendations for scholars and 
practitioners.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to draw upon physician-provided data 
to determine why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has 
remained high despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. The study was 
carried out in a quantitative, cross-sectional manner that relied primarily on the 
inferential technique of the one-sample t test, Wilcoxon Signed Ranked test, and the 
administration of a diagnostic software attitudes and usage survey of 3,100 AMA-
accredited physicians of whom 97 completed the survey. The purpose of this study was to 
measure physicians’ attitudes to diagnostic software in a manner that could identify 
physician-perceived hindrances to and benefits of the use of diagnostic software.    
In addressing the question of why the widespread adoption of diagnostic software 
has not coincided with a decrease in the prevalence of misdiagnosis, I used a quantitative 
approach to determine which of some of the possible answers to this question—
diagnostic software insufficiency, insufficient/improper use by physicians, or liability—is 
more popular with physicians and to determine whether answers to this question vary 
significantly depending on the demographic and professional characteristics of 
physicians, with an emphasis on gender, specialty area, and physician age. 
AMA offers a master list of U.S.-licensed physicians through their professional database 
licensees. I contacted one the licensees that provided a list of 3,100 physicians. I sent 
recruitment emails to these AMA-accredited physicians and invited them to complete my 
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questionnaire on Survey Monkey platform. A total of 99 physicians responded from 
where I collected the data for the analysis. 
All of the survey questions differentiated between doctors’ own use of diagnostic 
software and their general perceptions about diagnostic software. Responses for all of the 
survey questions were conducted on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 = completely disagree, 
2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat 
agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = completely agree.  
To determine the relationship between the variables, for the first two research 
questions of the study, the independent variable was whether diagnostic software was 
used and the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the third research 
question of the study, the independent variable was knowledge of diagnostic software and 
the dependent variable was reduction of misdiagnosis. For the fourth research question of 
the study, the independent variable was liability concern and the dependent variable was 
use of diagnostic software. I used the online survey tool, SurveyMonkey, to collect 
research data and the SPSS computing application to analyze the data. I conducted two 
one-tailed one-sample t tests on each survey question and used tables to report the result 
of the survey data. 
Research Question 1 
For Research Question 1, in the survey I asked if physicians thought the use 
diagnostic software helped to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare versus unassisted 
human diagnostic methods.  The result of my analysis led to rejection of H01. Speaking 
for themselves, but not for the profession in general, physicians indicated their thought 
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that diagnostic software did in fact decrease misdiagnosis versus unassisted human 
diagnostic methods.   
Research Question 2 
For Research Question 2, I asked in the survey if physicians use diagnostic 
software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. The result of my 
analysis led to rejection of H02. Speaking for themselves, but not for the profession in 
general, physicians indicated their belief that they used diagnostic software frequently 
enough to detect misdiagnoses in healthcare. 
Research Question 3 
For Research Question 3, I asked in the survey if physicians’ knowledge of 
diagnostic software was extensive enough to decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare. 
Speaking for both themselves and the profession in general, physicians did not indicate 
that there was enough knowledge of diagnostic software to decrease misdiagnoses in 
healthcare. I have not found evidence to reject this statement, so my analysis resulted in 
retaining H03. 
Research Question 4 
For Research Question 4, I asked if liability concerns prevent physicians from 
using diagnostic software.  Speaking for both themselves and the profession in general, 
there is statistically significant evidence that the doctors in the sample have a different 
opinion than “neither agree or disagree”. If I had done a two-tailed test, I would have 
rejected the null hypothesis that the doctors would neither agree or disagree that liability 
concerns prevent physicians from using diagnostic software. The majority of the 
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physicians in this sample clearly indicated that liability concerns would not prevented 
physicians from using diagnostic software.  
 The results of hypothesis testing for the first and second null hypotheses were 
rejected using both one-sample t tests and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
Therefore, one-sample t test and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test agreed on this 
result. The results of hypothesis testing for the fourth and eighth null hypotheses were the 
same when one-sample t tests and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test were run 
separately for those physicians who thought liability concerns did not prevent them from 
using diagnostic software. 
Finally, the results of hypothesis testing for the Null Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, and 7 that 
were rejected using one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were not rejected using one 
sample t test. These results indicated that there were statistically significant difference 
between one-sample t test and one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  Since the findings 
of the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in this instance were not in accordance 
with the findings of the one-sample t tests, the limitation of non normality did appear to 
compromise the results of the study. The purpose of the previous chapter of the study was 
to present and comment on the statistical characteristics of the results associated with the 
study. The purpose of the present chapter of the study is to (a) summarize the relevant 
findings, (b) explore the implications of the findings with respect to the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2, (c) generate recommendations for scholars and physicians, (d) 
discuss the limitations of the study, and (e) discuss the significance of the study. Each of 
these purposes will be addressed in a separate section of the chapter. 
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Summary of Findings 
The research question-based findings of the study were as follows. First, physicians 
disagreed that their personal use of diagnostic software was likely to result in more 
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods. Thus, there is 
statistical support for the conclusion that physicians in the sample thought that use of 
diagnostic software was likely to result in less misdiagnoses than unassisted human 
diagnostic methods. This is an important facet of the findings in that it exhibits the 
perception of value of diagnostic software on behalf of physicians. Second, I asked in the 
survey if physicians use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses 
in healthcare. Speaking for themselves, but not for the profession in general, physicians 
disagreed that they did not personally use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnoses in healthcare. On the other hand, speaking for the profession in 
general, there is insufficient statistical evidence to refute the null hypothesis that 
physicians did not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnoses in 
healthcare. Finally, there was evidence that suggested fairly strongly that physicians 
agreed that liability concerns did not prevent them from using diagnostic software and 
that physicians agreed that physicians in general were not prevented from using 
diagnostic software because of liability concerns.  
 
In the next section of this chapter, these findings will be discussed in relation to 
the existing literature on diagnostic software. Particular attention will be paid to the ways 
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in which the findings of the study complement, contradict, or add context to the existing 
empirical findings as well as to theories of diagnostic software use. 
Relation of Findings to Literature 
Perhaps the most important finding in the current study with respect to the 
existing literature was the finding that physicians did not think that the use of diagnostic 
software would result in more misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic methods. 
This finding can be interpreted as an endorsement of diagnostic software. If, in 
physicians’ opinions, the use of diagnostic software is likely to result in fewer diagnostic 
errors than unaided human diagnostics, then diagnostic software is serving its intended 
function of improving clinical outcomes. If so, then the appropriate follow-up question is 
to ask why, if physicians endorse the clinical usefulness of diagnostic software, 
misdiagnosis continues to be such a pressing problem in the American healthcare system. 
While this question was not directly posed to the participants in the study, an answer to it 
can nonetheless be inferred from the fact that 42 of the 97 participants in the study, or just 
over 43% of the participants, had never used any form of diagnostic software as of the 
time of being surveyed. However, physicians in the sample seemed to think they used the 
diagnostic software enough to decrease misdiagnoses than unassisted human diagnostic 
methods.  They just thought other doctors have used it enough. To address such a great 
discrepancy, I would recommend that future researchers seek to determine not only the 
usage rates and confidence of doctors in relation to diagnostic software but also the cost. 
It might be true that diagnostic software is clinically effective but not widespread 
enough to lower misdiagnosis in a significant way. If so, then it is natural to ask why the 
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adoption rate of diagnostic software is not higher. Technology adoption theories typically 
share the assumption that technology is adopted to the extent that it is found useful by 
adopters, barring mitigating factors such as high expense, the absence of organizational 
support, and high effort of use (Shah & Gardner, 2008; Spekowius & Wendler, 2006; 
Van Grembergern & De Haes, 2009). While these factors were not measured in the 
current study, the existing literature suggests that diagnostic software is relatively easy to 
use and is not expensive relative to other items of medical technology (Menachemi et al., 
2009; Renz et al., 2012; Seeley, 2009; Shield et al., 2010). Additionally, I found that 
liability was not a concern for physicians’ vis-à-vis diagnostic software. The main 
uninvestigated variable is likely institutional support. It is not clear, at least based on the 
existing research, whether the use of diagnostic software is institutionally supported in 
the American healthcare establishment. The absence of such support would help to 
explain the otherwise paradoxical finding that physicians find diagnostic software to be 
useful in reducing medical error while overall adoption of this technology remains 
relatively low.     
Relation of Findings to Theory 
The questions in the study were not designed to explore the roles or 
characteristics of the three theoretical roots of diagnosis—that is, computing, satisficing, 
and intuition. However, the findings did not generally support the planned behavior 
model (Ajzen, 2005). Physicians who had not actually used diagnostic software had the 
same kinds of opinions about its usefulness and capabilities as physicians who had used 
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diagnostic software. As discussed in Chapter 4, the one-sample t test results for non 
adopters and adopters of diagnostic software yielded the same hypothesis testing results.  
Clearly, then, there are many nonadopters of diagnostic software that nonetheless 
have a positive view of such software and who might not have adopted the software 
because of institutional pressures or other structural reasons. One of the shortcomings of 
the planned behavior model in this regard is that it is not as adept at measuring the impact 
of external forces, such as organizational mandates, in the formation of individual 
behavior. Future scholars who study the adoption or non adoption of diagnostic software 
among physicians might be better served with a theoretical model more capable of 
measuring environmental and institutional pressures. 
Limitations of the Study 
One of the statistical limitations of the study that became apparent during the 
process of data analysis was that three medical specialties—family medicine, OB/GYN, 
and internal medicine—represented more than 56% of the entire sample. The analysis in 
Chapter 4 revealed that segmenting the sample into the three medical specialties versus 
all other specialties did not result in any non significant p values becoming significant or 
significant p values becoming non significant. Future researchers who draw a sample of 
physicians that is more balanced with respect to medical specialty can likely overcome 
this limitation. In more general terms, the small size of the study (N = 97) is likely to 
constitute an innate limit to the validity and reliability of results (note that the measured 
Cronbach’s Alpha was .761); studies with significantly larger samples might find that the 
results of the present study might not be replicated. Another limitation of the study was 
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that the data for the eight survey prompts relating to diagnostic software use were not 
normally distributed, leading to the supplemental use of the one-sample Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test.  
Recommendations for Scholars and Physicians 
One appropriate recommendation for future researchers is to draw a sample of 
physicians that is more balanced with respect to the representation of different medical 
specialties. The fact that over half of the respondents came from three of the 24 
occupations surveyed did not significantly impact the results of hypothesis testing, but 
drawing a larger and more balanced collection of specialty areas might nonetheless 
improve future results.  It would also be appropriate for scholars to attempt to understand 
the apparent paradox of physicians’ thoughts in the clinical utility of diagnostic software 
combined with a low adoption rate. This may be due to the economic factors associated 
with diagnostic software.  It is recommended that future researchers seek to determine not 
only the usage rates and confidence of doctors in relation to diagnostic software but also 
the cost. Given that 43% of respondents have not adopted diagnostic software, yet a 
substantial proportion of respondents find such software to be valuable, there must be 
additional variables that this study failed to address.  
The current study contained no findings that can explain this apparent paradox. It 
might be the case that physicians find diagnostic software useful in personal practice but 
they are not allowed to use it in certain practice settings. Alternatively, the costs 
associated with establishing a diagnostic software-capable system may be too great for 
smaller organizations. Whatever the case, scholars ought to investigate this paradox 
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further; a study with a larger sample might find that the paradox does not exist at all and 
that physicians’ opinions of the usefulness of diagnostic software are aligned with the 
actual adoption rate of diagnostic software.  
A recommendation for physicians is to speak more frequently to their peers about 
both the benefits and disadvantages of diagnostic software. Roughly, 43% of participants 
in the current study were non adopters of diagnostic software; the 57% of physicians who 
were adopters to initiate a dialogue with non adopting peers and to share information 
could be instrumental in promoting diagnostic software adoption. Communication 
amongst medical professionals related to diagnostic software may also help to identify 
the most effective products available to suit their specific needs.  In addition, the 
existence of such dialogue could help physicians who have already adopted diagnostic 
software to learn and adopt best practices in the use of such software from more 
advanced peers.    
Significance of the Study 
Diagnostic software is a popular, cost-efficient, and clinically powerful healthcare 
tool (O’Malley et al., 2010; Puech et al., 2009; Randeree, 2007). The purpose of this 
quantitative, survey-based study was to draw upon physician-provided data to determine 
why, at least in physicians’ opinions, the prevalence of misdiagnosis has remained high 
despite the widespread adoption of diagnostic software. It was found that physicians 
thought diagnostic software to be more capable of reducing misdiagnosis than unassisted 
human diagnosis, which can be interpreted as a general endorsement of diagnostic 
software. However, overall adoption of diagnostic software remained low. The study was 
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significant because the results provided empirical insight to this apparent paradox, which 
might be explained through the variable of institutional support for diagnostic software. 
Additionally, I presented findings that called attention to the absence of gender-, 
specialty-, and age-related differences, which might suggest that physicians’ attitudes to 
diagnostic software are related to core concerns of the profession rather than to 
demographic differences.      
Implications for Social Change 
The social significance of the study lies in its affirmation of the usefulness of diagnostic 
software, at least in the opinion of physicians. Medical misdiagnosis is an enormously 
costly social problem in terms of lives lost and health compromised; according to Leavitt 
and Leavitt (2011), approximately 100,000 people die every year in the United States 
because of misdiagnosis. If physicians themselves think that diagnostic software is 
superior to unassisted human diagnosis, as was found in the current study, then there is 
additional support for the use of diagnostic software to reduce the incidence of 
misdiagnosis. If this study contributes, however modestly, to the increased adoption of 
diagnostic software, then it will have helped to address the various social problems—
including problems of lost life, health, and productivity—caused by misdiagnosis. Thus, 
the main implication for social change in the study is its support for the broader use of 
diagnostic software by physicians, which might result in the lowering of misdiagnosis.  
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Appendix A: Diagnostic Software Survey Form for Study 
Management of Diagnostic Software Survey Form for Study 
 
 
1. To which of the following types of diagnostic medical software have you ever had 
            access?   
Isabel   
DXplain   
Your Rapid Diagnosis   
DiagnosisPro   
Connectance   
Other___________________ 
None   (Please skip Questions 2 – 12) 
 
2. Which of the following types of diagnostic medical software have you ever used?   
Isabel   
DXplain   
Your Rapid Diagnosis   
DiagnosisPro   
Connectance   
Other___________________ 
None   (Please skip Questions 3 – 12) 
 
3. How long have you had access to diagnostic medical software?  
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0 - 6 months  
6 months – 1 year  
1 - 3 years  
3 - 5 years   
More than 5 years  
 
4. How long have you used diagnostic medical software?  
0 - 6 months  
6 months – 1 year  
1 - 3 years  
3 - 5 years   
More than 5 years  
 
5. To which of the following types of diagnostic medical software do you currently 
have access?    
Isabel   
DXplain   
Your Rapid Diagnosis   
DiagnosisPro   
Connectance   
Other_________________ 
None 
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6. Which of the following types of diagnostic medical software do you currently 
use?   
Isabel   
DXplain   
Your Rapid Diagnosis   
DiagnosisPro   
Connectance   
Other___________________ 
None 
 
7. How long have you been using the software you are currently using?   
0 - 6 months  
6 months – 1 year  
1 - 3 years  
3 - 5 years   
More than 5 years  
 
(Questions 8 – 12 are individual in nature) 
8. My use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more misdiagnoses in 
healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods? 
Strongly Disagree 
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Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
9. I do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to decrease misdiagnosis in 
healthcare? 
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
10.      My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough that I am able to use 
it effectively?  
Strongly Disagree 
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Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
11. My knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough to result in a 
decrease in misdiagnosis?  
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
12. Liability concerns do not prevent me from using diagnostic software? 
  Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
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Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
 (Questions 13 – 16 are general in nature) 
13.  In general, physicians’ use of diagnostic software is likely to result in more 
misdiagnoses in healthcare than unassisted human diagnostic methods?  
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
  
14. In general, physicians do not use diagnostic software frequently enough to 
decrease misdiagnosis in healthcare?  
Strongly Disagree 
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Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
15. In general, physicians’ knowledge of diagnostic software is not extensive enough 
to result in a decrease in misdiagnosis?  
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
 
16. In general, liability concerns do not prevent physicians from using diagnostic 
software? 
Strongly Disagree 
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Disagree 
Somewhat Disagree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree  
Not Applicable 
  
17 What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
Transgender 
 
18. How old are you? 
Less than 30 years old 
30-40 years old 
41-50 years old 
51-60 years old 
61-65 years old 
More than 65 years old 
 
19. How long have you had a license to practice medicine? 
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Less than 5 years  
5-10 years   
11-20 years   
21-30 years   
More than 30 years 
 
20.      What is your specialty area?  ____________________________________ 
 
21. In what area of the U.S. do you practice medicine?   
New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Vermont)  
Mid-Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania)  
South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia) 
South (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Texas) 
Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin) 
Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, 
Wyoming) 
Pacific (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington)   
 
